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Contract Design, Default Rules, and 
Delaware Corporate Law 
  Jeffrey Manns* & Robert Anderson** 
Abstract 
Incomplete contract theory recognizes that contracts 
cannot be comprehensive and that state law necessarily has to 
fill in gaps when conflicts arise. The more complex the 
transaction, the more that lawyers face practical constraints that 
force them to limit the scope of drafting and broadly rely on legal 
defaults and open-ended terms to plug holes and address 
contingencies. In theory Delaware law serves as lawyers’ 
preferred jurisdiction and forum for merger and acquisition 
(M&A) transactions and other high-end corporate deals because 
of the state’s superior default rules for corporate law and its 
judiciary’s expertise in discerning the “hypothetical bargain” of 
the parties. 
This paper sets out to examine whether lawyers’ professed 
confidence in Delaware defaults actually shows up in the 
drafting of merger and acquisition agreements. Lawyers may 
base deals in Delaware law because of their familiarity with its 
provisions, or Delaware’s appeal may reflect the substantive 
adding of value in filling contractual gaps. Our premise is that 
the best proxy for examining lawyers’ reliance on a jurisdiction’s 
defaults is the extent of brevity in legal drafting, which is closely 
related to reliance on standards rather than rules. Incomplete 
contract theory predicts that reliance on defaults should broadly 
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translate into implicit (and explicit) references to existing 
defaults that conserve time and space in drafting, especially 
through the use of parsimonious standards rather than prolix 
rules. To the extent to which comparable contracts grounded in 
different jurisdictions have systematic differences in length, this 
finding would serve as evidence that lawyers are placing greater 
reliance on the defaults of one jurisdiction compared to another. 
In this paper we compare the length of public company 
merger and acquisition (M&A) agreements between Delaware 
transactions and those governed by the law of other jurisdictions. 
To the extent practitioners regard Delaware law as more 
comprehensive, more precise, or more settled (due to the 
Delaware General Corporation law, case law, or the judicial 
system) compared to other jurisdictions, then we would expect 
that Delaware M&A agreements would be more concise because 
of greater reliance on defaults and open-ended terms.  
We found agreements governed by Delaware law are no 
shorter, and in fact are generally longer than agreements 
governed by the law of other states even when we accounted for a 
spectrum of control variables including the deal structure, the 
quality of law firms, deal complexity, and the size of the 
transaction. This finding held true even when we identified and 
controlled for the textual source of the precedent documents. Our 
results challenge the conventional wisdom about contracting 
parties’ placing greater reliance on Delaware law. 
Our findings suggest that a gap exists between the Delaware 
legal system’s outsized reputation and the actual practice of 
lawyers in drafting M&A agreements who appear to place no 
more reliance on the defaults of Delaware law than on the 
defaults of other jurisdictions. This finding calls into question 
why Delaware’s statutory and judicial defaults do not appear to 
matter in the contracting context in which the Delaware 
difference compared to other states should be the most apparent. 
Lawyers’ confidence in Delaware may be genuine when it comes 
to steering incorporations and M&A litigation to Delaware. But 
if lawyers rely on the defaults of Delaware contract law no more 
(and perhaps less) in contract drafting than that of other 
jurisdictions, then it suggests that Delaware’s reputation for 
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corporate law exceeds its substance. We conclude that the text is 
likely influenced far more by fortuitous events in the drafting 
process, such as the precedent chosen, than by the default rules 
of the jurisdiction. 
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Every contract is necessarily incomplete.1 Contracting 
parties have neither the interest, the time, nor the ability to 
anticipate and address every contingency. Lawyers must 
therefore rely extensively on statutory and judicial defaults and 
open-ended terms, such as “commercially reasonable efforts” or 
“consent not to be unreasonably withheld.”2 Contracting parties 
invest time in negotiating deal-specific terms, but must weigh 
the costs and value of contracting around defaults that raise 
interpretive ambiguities or that the parties perceive to be 
undesirable.3 The result is that incomplete contract theory 
predicts a spectrum approach to contracting. The greater the 
 
 1. Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Incomplete Contracts in a 
Complete Contract World, 33 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 725, 725 (2006).   
 2. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual 
Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 732–33 
(1992) (examining how transaction costs and market power shape contracting 
parties’ incentives to contract around default rules); Robert E. Scott, The Law 
and Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 279, 280– 81 
(2006) (discussing how the law and economic theory of incomplete contracts 
has developed analytic tools to address the problems posed in the contracting 
process). 
 3. See, e.g., Baker & Krawiec, supra note 1, at 733–34 (discussing the 
role of statutory and judiciary defaults in “completing” incomplete contracts 
by filling gaps in contracts or refusing to fill contractual gaps); Richard 
Craswell, The Incomplete Contracts Literature and Efficient Precautions, 56 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 151, 156–57 (2006) (discussing how “the literature 
on incomplete contracts might just as accurately be referred to as the 
literature on ‘incomplete courts’” because it recognizes that “the efficiency of 
key decisions cannot be evaluated perfectly by courts”); OLIVER HART, FIRMS, 
CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 37–38 n.15 (1995) (arguing that 
problems related to vague provisions should push parties to craft alternative 
provisions that have greater clarity or are more easily verifiable); Charles J. 
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the 
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 
261, 289–98 (1985) (arguing that default rules should be chosen to provide 
terms that would minimize contracting parties’ cumulative transaction costs); 
Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in 
Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 
765–67 (1997) (discussing how reliance on defaults enhances contractual 
drafting efficiency and increases network benefits for contracting parties).  
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confidence parties have in the defaults of a jurisdiction (and 
judicial interpretation of those defaults), the more concise 
contracts will be as parties broadly rely on default rules and 
open-ended terms to minimize the costs of transactional 
drafting and other costs associated with detailed rules.4 
This paper leverages this insight to examine empirically 
whether Delaware’s reputation for comprehensive, precise, and 
settled corporate law shapes the actions of lawyers when they 
are drafting merger and acquisition agreements. Delaware has 
long served as the destination of choice for incorporations and 
as the most appealing forum for the adjudication of business and 
finance litigation, such as mergers and acquisition litigation.5  
Most commentators have attributed Delaware’s appeal to its 
ostensibly superior legal system.6 “Race to the top” advocates 
believe Delaware has won a competition among the states in 
producing a statutory framework and specialized Court of 
Chancery that enhance shareholder value.7  In contrast, “race to 
 
 4. See, e.g.,  Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness 
in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 
881–95 (2010) (discussing the efficiency enhancing effects from contractual 
vagueness in the material adverse change clause context); Richard A. Posner, 
The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 
1582–83 (2005) (“[C]ontracts are likely to be shorter the more competent the 
judges are because lawyers will not have to spell out everything for a dim 
interpreter.”); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the 
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 594–607 (2003) (providing an 
overview of the role of defaults in shaping contractual drafting under 
incomplete contract theory).   
 5. Approximately 60 percent of publicly traded companies in the United 
States are incorporated in Delaware including 63 percent of the Fortune 500 
companies. See DEL. DEP’T OF STATE, DIV. OF CORPS., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, 1 
(2010), https://perma.cc/XW3Y-B7UY (PDF). Over 90 percent of 
publicly-traded companies that are incorporated in a state outside of their 
principal base of operations are incorporated in Delaware. See Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & 
ECON. 383, 391, 420 (2003) (“The choice is thus not among a multitude of 
competitors for the national market but rather between incorporating in the 
home state or in Delaware.”). 
 6. See infra note 7 and accompanying text.   
 7. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 306–07 (2d ed. 
1977) (arguing that Delaware’s appetite for tax revenues from corporate 
charters incentivized it to develop efficient corporate law rules); RALPH K. 
WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 28–42 (1978) (developing the 
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the bottom” advocates argue that Delaware statutes and case 
law merely excel at adding managerial value and entrenching 
managers at the expense of shareholders.8 But both advocates 
 
“race to the top” argument in greater detail); Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. 
Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28 J.L. & ECON. 
179, 184–90 (1985) (arguing that companies “will select their state of 
incorporation adaptively” leading to a “race to the top” among states); Robert 
Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 
527– 31 (2001) (analyzing the Tobin’s Q of Delaware corporations versus 
non-Delaware corporations to argue that incorporation in Delaware adds 
value); Daniel R. Fischel, The ‘Race to the Bottom’ Revisited: Reflections on 
Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporate Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 
919–20 (1982) (pointing to the greater market valuation of Delaware versus 
non-Delaware firms in arguing that Delaware “has achieved its prominent 
position because its permissive corporation law maximizes, rather than 
minimizes, shareholders’ welfare”); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some 
Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 265–73 (1985) 
(arguing that the positive market reaction to reincorporations in Delaware 
suggests that state competition results in a “race to the top”); Guhan 
Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 
35– 38 (2004) (applying the Tobin’s Q approach to show that Delaware law 
adds a modest, though declining amount of value compared to other states); 
Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 289–92 (1977) (arguing that state 
competition results in a “race to the top”); Michal Barzuza & David C. Smith, 
What Happens in Nevada? Self-Selecting into Lax Law, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 
3593, 3616–17 (2014) (finding there is a premium for Delaware incorporation 
based on a comparison of the Tobin’s Q of Delaware and Nevada corporations).  
 8. See, e.g., Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558–59 (1933) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting) (framing the competition among states for incorporation 
revenues as a race “not of diligence but of laxity”); RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN 
& JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 54–61 (1976) (framing 
Delaware’s preeminence as a product of catering to management rather than 
shareholders); Oren Bar-Gill, Michal Barzuza & Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The 
Market for Corporate Law, 162 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 134, 
137–41 (2006) (developing a formal model that suggests that Delaware law 
systematically favors managers over shareholders in contexts where their 
interests conflict); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The 
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
1437, 1440–45 (1992) (arguing that “state competition produces a race for the 
top with respect to some corporate issues but a race for the bottom with respect 
to others” in which managers’ interests conflict with shareholders); Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State 
Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1775, 1820–21 (2002) 
(providing empirical evidence that state competition results in corporate 
governance rules that benefit managers but potentially at the expense of 
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and critics of Delaware have a common theme: Delaware’s legal 
system stands out from other states which creates incentives to 
rely on Delaware law. Therefore, we would expect that lawyers 
would place greater confidence in the defaults established by 
Delaware statutes, case law, and the Court of Chancery to 
further either shareholder or managerial value, which should be 
apparent in the drafting of contracts.   
In this paper, we subject this ostensible confidence in 
Delaware to empirical scrutiny to assess whether the actual 
drafting of merger agreements appears to reflect greater 
reliance on the statutory and judicial defaults under Delaware 
law compared to that of other states. In an earlier work, The 
Delaware Delusion, we showed empirically that both the “race 
to the top” and “race to the bottom” schools of thought may rest 
on a flawed premise because the decision to incorporate in 
Delaware does not appear to affect how financial markets value 
publicly traded companies.9 We leveraged the fact that every 
merger of companies in different states constitutes an 
“acquisition reincorporation” because the target corporation’s 
assets are redeployed from the target corporation’s regime of 
corporate law into the surviving corporation’s regime of 
 
shareholders); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections 
Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 633, 665–66 (1974) (sparking the debate on the 
efficiency of Delaware law by arguing Delaware was leading a “race for the 
bottom”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Modernization of Corporate Law: An 
Essay for Bill Cary, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 187, 209–11 (1983) (arguing for the 
need to reexamine corporate law to remedy rules that favor managers at the 
expense of shareholders); Richard W. Jennings, Federalization of Corporation 
Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 BUS. LAW. 991, 993–94 (1976) (arguing 
Delaware favors managerial over shareholder interests); Stanley A. Kaplan, 
Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31 BUS. LAW. 
883, 885–87 (1976) (framing Delaware as leading a “race of leniency” towards 
management); Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 
OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 555–57 (1984) (arguing states compete in a “race to the 
bottom” because corporate law systematically favors management over 
shareholder interests and that reforms are unlikely because managers will 
“flee” to other states); Gordon G. Young, Federal Corporate Law, Federalism, 
and the Federal Courts, 41 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 146, 151 (1977) (arguing 
Delaware’s appeal lies in its leadership of the “race to the bottom”). 
 9. See Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Delaware Delusion, 93 
N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1077–85 (2015) (presenting the results of our empirical 
study).   
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corporate law.10 By comparing the reaction of capital markets to 
mergers that reincorporated companies into and out of 
Delaware, we were able to show that the financial world places 
no apparent value on the alleged superiority of the Delaware 
legal system.11 
Our previous work left an important issue unresolved: 
whether lawyers themselves perceive value associated with 
Delaware law and courts. This question is particularly 
important because lawyers choose Delaware as the locus of 
jurisdiction and chosen forum for a larger percentage of merger 
and acquisition agreements.12 But that fact in itself does not 
reveal the extent of reliance on Delaware defaults (as it could be 
explained by path dependence, familiarity with Delaware law, 
or other non-substantive factors).13 In this article we analyze 
the confidence, or lack thereof, that lawyers appear to place in 
Delaware law in drafting merger and acquisition agreements. 
Our premise is that the best proxy for reliance on defaults and 
open-ended terms is brevity in legal drafting. Contracts will 
vary in length due to deal-specific differences, but incomplete 
contract theory predicts that reliance on defaults should 
translate into implicit (and explicit) references to existing 
defaults that conserve time and space in drafting. To the extent 
to which comparable contracts grounded in different 
jurisdictions have statistically significant differences in length, 
this finding would serve as evidence that lawyers are placing 
greater reliance on the defaults of one jurisdiction compared to 
another. 
Merger and acquisition (M&A) agreements offer an 
appealing setting to test empirically the extent of lawyers’ 
reliance on Delaware defaults compared to those of other 
jurisdictions. M&A agreements combine a high degree of 
time-sensitive negotiation with extensive reliance on statutory 
 
 10. Id. at 1067–68.   
 11. Id. at 1080–86. 
 12. See infra Tables 2A–2C. 
 13. See infra Part VI.A. 
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and judicial defaults.14 M&A agreements are generally based on 
precedents from earlier deals to lower the costs of contracting, 
which in theory incentivizes lawyers to rely on preexisting 
open-ended terms from the earlier agreements and legal 
defaults.15 The fact that M&A agreements are generally drafted 
under tight time constraints also means that the parties and 
their lawyers must weigh carefully the degree of time and 
resources to invest in negotiating and crafting terms that 
deviate from defaults (as well as the risks from failing to do 
so).16 The comparable substance and time frames for public 
company M&A agreements means that it is easier to make 
apples to apples comparisons to assess the extent of reliance on 
defaults. 
We compare the length of public company merger and 
acquisition (M&A) agreements between Delaware transactions 
and those governed by the law of other jurisdictions. Our 
premise is that if other jurisdictions pose greater uncertainties 
(compared to Delaware) then we would expect lawyers in 
comparable non-Delaware agreements to invest more effort in 
delineating more specific, rule-oriented provisions and in 
contracting around undesirable defaults. Those specific, 
rule-oriented provisions would require additional words, which 
translate into greater length of agreements. 
Our results show that agreements governed by Delaware 
law are no shorter, and are in fact systematically longer than 
agreements governed by the law of other states even when we 
 
 14. See Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, Engineering Greater 
Efficiency in Mergers and Acquisitions, 72 BUS. LAW. 657, 690 (2017) (detailing 
the reasons M&A agreements are time-sensitive). 
 15. See Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, Boiling Down Boilerplate in 
M&A Agreements: A Response to Choi, Gulati, & Scott, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 
219, 229 (2019) (explaining how M&A agreements are made); see also STEPHEN 
J. CHOI, ET AL., INNOVATION VERSUS ENCRUSTATION: AGENCY COSTS IN 
CONTRACT REPRODUCTION 45 (July 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/FKN5-QRRV 
(PDF) (discussing how lawyers in private equity M&A deals engage in higher 
levels of innovation in drafting compared to corporate and sovereign bond 
contracts, yet also carry over more obsolete and encrusted terms from previous 
deals).   
 16. See Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Inefficient Evolution of 
Merger Agreements, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57, 66 (2017) (describing the 
benefits of beginning contract drafting with defaults). 
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accounted for a spectrum of control variables including the deal 
structure, the quality of law firms, deal complexity, and the size 
of the transaction. This finding held true even when we 
identified and excluded the Delaware (and other states’) 
jurisdiction-specific language. In fact, the most predictive 
variable for the length of an agreement turned out to be the 
length of the precedent agreement from which counsel copied 
the original draft. This fact suggests that lawyers place little 
reliance on the statutory and judicial defaults and that 
Delaware law matters little as an “off-the-rack” default to 
economize on the costs of drafting.   
Our findings suggest that there is a gap between lawyers’ 
professed and actual confidence in Delaware law and courts.17 
Lawyers may simply give lip service to the reputation of 
Delaware law and its judiciary, but in the context of M&A 
contract design, lawyers appear to pay less attention to the 
statutory and judicial defaults than they would to the defaults 
of any other jurisdiction.18 These results have important 
implications for both Delaware corporate law and for contract 
design, where the tradeoff between ex ante drafting costs and ex 
post enforcement costs is paramount.19 
Our finding that lawyers rely on the defaults of Delaware 
no more (and possibly less) than those of other jurisdictions also 
suggests that Delaware is living off its past reputation and that 
the Delaware legislature and courts may need to address the 
comprehensiveness and precision of Delaware contract law to 
maintain Delaware’s reputation in the long run.   
Part II of our paper explains the incomplete nature of 
contracting and its application to M&A drafting. Part III applies 
this incomplete contracting framework to our empirical strategy 
in the M&A context. Part IV describes the dataset we created to 
test the “Delaware default” hypothesis. Part V presents our 
 
 17. See, e.g., William J. Carney, George B. Shepherd, & Joanna 
Shepherd, Lawyers, Ignorance, and the Dominance of Delaware Corporate 
Law, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 123, 134–42 (pointing to survey data to argue that 
lawyers’ confidence in and reliance on Delaware corporate law is based both 
on Delaware’s reputation and lawyers’ ignorance of the alternative corporate 
law frameworks offered by other states). 
 18. See infra Part VI. 
 19. See infra Part VI. 
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results. Part VI explains the potential implications of our 
findings. 
II. Drafting in a World of Incomplete Contracts 
A. The Incomplete Nature of Contracts 
Explaining the nature and incentive effects of “incomplete 
contracts” has been a longstanding theme of contracts 
scholarship.20 Contracts consist of an interplay of statutory and 
judicially crafted mandates, default rules, and tailored 
provisions.21 The scope and nature of statutory provisions may 
evolve over time due to legislative changes or exogenous shocks 
of judicial interpretations of contract-related statutes.22 But in 
any given drafting context the working assumption is that 
lawyers are able to anticipate with a high degree of certainty 
the likely constraints on the parties imposed by statutory 
mandates because they are grounded in settled law.23 Similarly, 
existing judicially created mandates can also be anticipated and 
addressed by the parties, such as the common law requirement 
 
 20. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 732–33 (examining how 
transaction costs and market power shape contracting parties’ incentives to 
contract around default rules); Craswell, supra note 3, at 1052–61 (providing 
an overview of the economic literature on incomplete contracts); Scott, supra 
note 2, at 280–81 (discussing how the law and economic theory of incomplete 
contracts has developed analytic tools to address the problems posed in the 
contracting process). 
 21. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87–89 (1989) 
(describing the legal rules of contracts). 
 22. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and 
Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 553 (1990) (comparing changes in 
duty of loyalty and duty of care). 
 23. See Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 
1093–94 (1972) (discussing the similar notion of immutable entitlements that 
exist outside of contract law); Stewart J. Schwab, A Coasean Experiment on 
Contract Presumptions, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 329 (1988) (explaining the 
differences between inalienable and immutable rules). 
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of consideration for contracts, which parties can deviate from 
only under narrow circumstances.24   
Academics have debated the extent to which statutory or 
judicially crafted mandates live up to goals of protecting parties 
to the contract or parties outside of the contract.25 But it is clear 
that the bedrock of statutory and judicially crafted mandates 
provide a starting point for crafting a contract. At the same time 
legislators leave mandatory provisions for contracts 
intentionally incomplete.26 Mandatory provisions provide broad 
rules to the contract negotiating and enforcement process 
through establishing principles such as the duty of good faith,27 
rather than the core substance of the contract itself.28 This is 
especially true in corporate law, in which mandatory rules are 
scarce and default rules are much of the substance of the law.29 
For this reason most of the debate on incomplete contracts 
centers on the nature and scope of state-created default rules 
and the degree of leeway given to the contracting parties.30 Both 
 
 24. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-203 (AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) 
(recognizing an exception from the common-law requirement for consideration 
in cases in which written agreements under seal serve as a substitute for 
consideration).   
 25. See, e.g., Tom Baker & Kyle D. Logue, Mandatory Rules and Default 
Rules in Insurance Contracts, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
INSURANCE LAW 377, 382–83 (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman eds., 2015) 
(discussing how justifications for mandatory rules are frequently based on 
claims of market failure); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 20–32 (1991) (discussing the 
objectives underpinning statutory mandates for contractual issues related to 
corporate law).   
 26. See Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 931, 938–44 (2003) (explaining why legislatures choose to leave 
“incomplete” laws). 
 27. See U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-209 cmt. 2, 2-305(2), 2-306(1), 2-311(1) (1977).   
 28. See Sarah Howard Jenkins, Contracting Out of Article 2: Minimizing 
the Obligation of Performance and Liability for Breach, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
401, 403 n.10 (2006) (listing the U.C.C.’s mandatory provisions). 
 29. See generally Black, supra note 22 (arguing corporate law rules that 
appear mandatory are often trivial or avoidable). 
 30. See generally Anthony Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 351, 370–71 (1978) (arguing that contractual efficiency is furthered by 
allowing parties to contract around legal rules); Jonathan Macey & Fred 
McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA. 
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the nature of the default rules and the scope for customization 
form bases for states to differentiate themselves in the “market 
for contracts.”31   
Statute-based defaults that contracting parties can opt out 
of are generally easy to identify through their express language. 
For example, numerous default rules of corporate law are 
clearly identified through language such as “unless otherwise 
 
L. REV. 701, 736–37 (1987) (advocating for statutes to allow parties to contract 
around legal rules when cheaper alternatives are available); Barry E. Adler, 
The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1999); 
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2; Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: 
Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992); David 
Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract 
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, 
Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989); 
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of 
the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. 
Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: 
Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 
COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and 
the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990); 
Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial 
Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990). 
 31. See, e.g., John C. Coates, Managing Disputes Through Contract: 
Evidence from M&A, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 295, 322–23 (2012) (discussing 
factors that influence choice of law and choice of forum); Theodore Eisenberg 
& Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study 
of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ 
Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1481–85 (2009) [hereinafter Eisenberg & 
Miller, Flight to New York] (analyzing New York’s efforts to appeal to 
corporations); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Ex Ante Choices of 
Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 
59 VAND. L. REV. 1973, 1979–83 (2006) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, Ex 
Ante Choices of Law and Forum] (discussing how New York and Delaware are 
the two states most frequently chosen for both choice of law and choice of 
forum); Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of 
Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1101–03 (2009) (arguing 
sophisticated parties “prefer a regime that strictly enforces formal contract 
terms absent an express invitation for judicial intervention”); Sarath Sanga, 
Choice of Law: An Empirical Analysis, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 894, 
902– 03 (2014) (analyzing choice of law clauses using a machine-coding 
algorithm). But see Kyle Chen et al., Empirical Study Redux on Choice of Law 
and Forum in M&A: The Data and Its Limits, 16 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 1, 4 (2015) 
(questioning studies that found that Delaware corporations choose contracts 
subject to New York law).   
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provided in the certificate of incorporation.”32 Frequently, states 
incorporate the standards and default rules for contracts by 
embracing the Uniform Commercial Code and contracts 
restatements.33 Judicially created default rules may be more 
difficult to identify and navigate.34 Some judicial decisions have 
created default rules that have broad applicability and form the 
common law of contract.35 But other judicially created default 
rules have evolved over time in a more patchwork way in 
response to omissions in contracts.36 The nature of the case by 
case construction of default rules inherently creates a degree of 
uncertainty in terms of the breadth and applicability of default 
rules.37 
 Although mandatory rules are often unavoidable, the 
applicability of both statutory and judicially created default 
rules are a product of both the choice of contracting parties and 
cost constraints in negotiations.38 The contracting parties rely 
heavily on defaults and case law because they lack either the 
economic incentives or the ability to anticipate and address all 
future contingencies.39 In practice this fact means that default 
rules established by state law and judicial precedents must 
 
 32. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 223 (2020). 
 33. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Common Law of Contract 
and the Default Rule Project, 102 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1525 (2016) (discussing the 
role of the American Law Institute and the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in crafting default rules and standards 
for Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the contracts restatements).  
 34. See id. at 1530–31 (discussing how common law default rules 
develop). 
 35. Id. at 1525–26. 
 36. See id. at 1537 (explaining the judicial gap-filling role in contract 
interpretation). 
 37. See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 2253 (2002) (stating judicial default rules and judicial 
error can “undermine planning”). 
 38. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4, at 608 n.144 (discussing the costs 
of avoiding an unappealing default rule). 
 39. See id. at 544–45 (framing the problem as the inability of the parties 
to achieve the goals of efficient reliance and efficient trade, i.e. to ensure that 
their agreement will maximize the expected surplus minus reliance costs). 
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necessarily serve to fill gaps in contracts.40 The debate over 
incomplete contracts has multiple dimensions in explaining why 
contracts are incomplete, but the common thread is the 
centrality of statutes and courts to address the inherent 
shortcomings of contractual drafting. 
Two primary stumbling blocks hinder the ability of 
contracting parties to anticipate and address contingencies that 
may affect their contracts.41 The first issue is the practical 
problem of ex ante transaction costs.42 One only needs to look at 
the Management Discussion & Analysis section of public 
company 10-Ks to see how it is possible to identify a sweeping 
range of potential risks affecting companies.43 But the 
transaction costs of anticipating the range of potential risks to 
a contract, as well as calculating and agreeing upon how to 
resolve each contingency in an efficient way, may far outweigh 
any potential benefits for the parties.44   
Parties may not be able to anticipate some risks at all, such 
as the absence of liquidity in the depths of the 2008 financial 
crisis or the exogenous economic shock caused by the COVID-19 
pandemic, which may make it challenging for a contract to cover 
all contingencies.45 The larger problem is the issue of 
low-probability contingencies, which could be recognized and 
addressed, but only at a cost that cannot be justified by the 
 
 40. See id. at 545 (“Parties trade efficiently when, and only when, the 
value of the exchanged performance to the buyer exceeds the cost of 
performance to the seller. Parties invest efficiently when their actions 
maximize a deal’s expected surplus.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 33, at 1530 n.19 
(distinguishing between “front end” costs and “back end costs”); Robert E. 
Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract 
Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 196–97 (2005) (proposing parties balance 
front end and back end costs to achieve “the efficient optimum”).   
 42. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 33, at 1530 n.19 (defining the “front 
end” or ex ante costs of “negotiating and drafting a contract term”). 
 43. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2019) (detailing instructions for filling out 
this section of 10-Ks). 
 44. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 33, at 1558–59 (analyzing 
contracting costs). 
 45. See Richard Squire, Clearinghouses as Liquidity Partitioning, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 857, 885 (2014) (explaining the importance of illiquidity in 
the 2008 financial crisis). 
  
1212 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1197 (2020) 
 
expected value of the offsetting benefits to the parties.46 These 
ex ante transaction costs make the incomplete nature of 
contracts virtually inevitable and necessitate at least partial 
reliance on state defaults.47 Parties may also strategically 
decide not to resolve potential contingencies for fear that 
disagreement about how to address them could signal negative 
information or otherwise stymie the deal, which leaves their 
future resolution in the hands of courts.48 When faced with 
contractual omissions that turn out to be relevant, courts are 
left with the task of gap filling by trying to identify the ex ante 
intentions of the contracting parties based on extrapolation 
from the issues the parties did address.49 This process entails 
uncertainty even though courts attempt to view the parties’ 
likely intentions in an objective way with an eye towards how 
future parties would respond to a judicially created default 
rule.50 
The second, related issue is the ex post enforcement costs.51 
Contingencies may occur that are not addressed in the contract, 
but the parties may be concerned that the costs of litigating the 
issue may outweigh the benefits of enforcing the contract.52 If 
the parties do proceed with litigation, the judicial process for 
interpreting contracts inherently entails a degree of uncertainty 
both in terms of the interpretation of facts and application of 
 
 46. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 759 (“Even if a party knows 
that a particular contingency is possible, the contingency may be considered 
so unlikely that it would not pay to become informed about the rule of law.”). 
 47. See id. (explaining various situations in which contingencies may not 
be addressed). 
 48. See id. at 731–33 (discussing how parties negotiate contracting costs). 
 49. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 33, at 1546–47. 
 50. See id. (proposing common law courts’ default rules demonstrate “how 
courts conceive their role in resolving contract disputes”). 
 51. See Posner, supra note 4, at 1582–84 (discussing the need to analyze 
both the ex ante and ex post transaction costs to the completion of contracts).   
 52. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After 
Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 857 (2003) (discussing 
the challenges courts may face in verifying the underlying facts behind a 
contract and related reliance which may undercut incentives to invest in 
contract design); see also Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: 
An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 271, 277 (1992) (discussing the various types of transaction and 
litigation costs that motivate contracting parties’ decisions). 
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law.53 It is possible that courts may not be positioned to identify 
some facts that underpin contractual provisions if they are 
contested by the contracting parties, yet courts may be able to 
identify other facts and terms with complete precision.54 The 
challenge is that judicial verification of facts will likely lie 
somewhere in between because of conflicts between the parties 
over the underlying facts.55 Additionally, the judicial 
application of the law creates its own set of uncertainties. While 
some contractual terms may be based on settled law,56 the 
process of interpreting ambiguous contractual provisions and 
related statutory provisions necessarily entails a degree of 
uncertainty.57   
This fact underscores the appeal of choosing a state law and 
forum with a large body of case law, high-quality statutes, and 
judges with the credibility and expertise to handle the 
uncertainties that contractual litigation entails.58 Arbitration, 
settlements, or renegotiations may allow parties to minimize 
 
 53. See generally Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating 
Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006) (discussing how 
parties design contracts in light of litigation risks). 
 54. See, e.g., id. at 817–18 (discussing the tension between verifiable and 
non-verifiable provisions).   
 55. See, e.g., id. at 818 (explaining the parties’ ability to “regulate the 
enforcement process”).   
 56. The scope of what constitutes settled law in contract may be far 
narrower than most lawyers appear to believe. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Mitu 
G. Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial 
Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1, 2–4 (2017) (discussing how boilerplate terms may 
lose their meaning over time in the context of the pari passu clause, a 
boilerplate provision in sovereign debt contracts); see also Anderson & Manns, 
supra note 15, at 221–23 (discussing how the text of boilerplate terms in M&A 
transactions rapidly evolve in unintended ways which potentially undercuts 
the terms’ meaning); Christopher C. French, Understanding Insurance 
Policies as Noncontracts: An Alternative Approach to Drafting and Construing 
These Unique Financial Instruments, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 535, 537 (2017) 
(discussing the difficulties of determining the intent of drafters of standard 
form language in insurance contracts). 
 57. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 53 at, 831–32 (explicating the 
variables in litigating contracts). 
 58. See infra Part VI.A. 
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the costs and uncertainties of the legal process.59 But the 
judicial process matters in these contexts too as arbitrations, 
settlements, and renegotiations would take place in the shadow 
of the expected judicial outcomes.60 
B. The Tradeoff Between Precision and Defaults 
The challenge parties face is that the tradeoff between ex 
ante transaction costs in drafting contracts and ex post 
enforcement costs is a spectrum question. No party can 
realistically draft contracts that address every possible 
contingency and contract away from all undesirable defaults, 
nor would parties want to because of the time, the costs, and the 
potential uncertainties created by deviating from defaults.61 
While parties may rely almost exclusively on default contractual 
agreements in basic standardized contracts (aside from the 
financial terms), complex contracts, such as merger agreements, 
necessarily entail some negotiated departures from defaults 
that may be mutually beneficial for the parties.62 For this reason 
contracting parties rely at least in part on a combination of 
defaults and open-ended terms that place faith in the courts to 
resolve disputes.63 We see that empirically as virtually any 
contract embraces state defaults and includes intentionally 
open-ended terms to capture a range of conduct and vest courts 
with a degree of ex post discretion in resolving conflicts.64 
This fact raises the question of how parties decide how to 
strike this balance. Part of the calculation is a weighing of the 
costs and benefits of investing time in negotiating and drafting 
 
 59. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 53, at 856–57 (“It is now common for 
parties to agree to have disputes resolved by arbitration rather than by 
litigation or by the court of a specified venue.”). 
 60. See, e.g., W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use 
and Create Precedent, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1096 (2012) (discussing how 
employment and class arbitrator decisions cite judicial precedents to signal 
that judicial precedent shape arbitration awards).   
 61. See supra notes 51–57 and accompanying text. 
 62. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 63. See supra notes 20–31 and accompanying text. 
 64. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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precise provisions, rather than relying on defaults.65 But 
another part of the equation is the degree of (implicit) confidence 
that lawyers place in a given jurisdiction.66 The more parties are 
concerned about the limitations of a judiciary’s ability to verify 
the underlying intentions or uncertainty costs in judges’ 
application of the law, the more we would expect to see contracts 
substituting precise terms for contractual defaults and 
minimizing the extent of open-ended contractual terms such as 
“commercial reasonableness” or “best efforts.”67 For example, 
parties can negotiate their way out of default rules in contracts 
to minimize the costs of enforcement, such as by requiring 
arbitration in the event of contractual disputes.68 But the more 
parties have confidence in the clarity of statutory defaults or the 
ability of courts to resolve disputes in a cost-effective and 
accurate way, the more we would expect them to reduce the 
up-front costs of contracting by relying on contractual defaults 
or opting for vague, rather than precise terms.69 
It would be difficult to upend all defaults and avoid all 
open-ended contractual terms entirely because of the extent to 
which they reduce ex ante transaction costs.70 But the law and 
economics literature would suggest that the more comfortable 
parties are with their choice of law and the related judicial 
backstop, the more they can minimize ex ante transaction costs 
 
 65. See supra notes 41–57 and accompanying text. 
 66. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 67. See, e.g., HART, supra note 3, at 37–38 n.15 (arguing that problems 
related to vague provisions should push parties to rely on alternative 
provisions that have greater clarity or are more easily verifiable). 
 68. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of 
Litigation and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 549, 550–51, 554–55 (2003) (arguing that contracting parties may prefer 
vague provisions if they anticipate addressing potential disputes through an 
arbitration process). 
 69. See, e.g., Scott & Triantis, supra note 53, at 818 (“A reduction in 
back-end enforcement costs should lead the parties to substitute more 
back-end for front-end investment by replacing precise provisions with vague 
terms.”).   
 70. See id. (“[S]ome of the rules governing litigation are default rules that 
the parties can vary or manipulate in their ex ante contract. By doing so, the 
parties can further reduce the cost of litigation and improve the ex ante 
incentive gains from enforcement.”). 
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by relying on defaults and open-ended contractual terms.71 
Thus, the existing literature suggests a testable comparative 
static: as the quality of default rules and courts increase, the 
number and complexity of terms in the negotiated contract 
should decrease.72 This point is a central premise of our paper 
as we are focusing on the question of whether firms relying on 
Delaware contract law (in the form of acquisition agreements) 
rather than the law of another state are more likely to act on 
that premise in relying on the defaults. 
III. Calibrating Legal Terms to Default Rules 
A. Background 
This article focuses on the degree to which M&A lawyers 
rely on defaults in drafting acquisition agreements under 
Delaware law compared to those under the law of other states. 
One way of assessing the substantive appeal of Delaware to 
M&A lawyers would be to analyze the degree of movement 
towards or “flight” of merger agreements away from Delaware 
choice of law and choice of forum clauses.73 This approach would 
be straightforward as in theory the more confidence lawyers 
have in Delaware the less likely they will be to end reliance on 
Delaware law and to stipulate that any disputes be adjudicated 
in another jurisdiction.74 The shortcoming of this approach is 
that the choice of law and choice of forum provisions may be tied 
to many other factors that have little to do with lawyers’ 
confidence in Delaware or lack thereof.75 
 
 71. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. 
 72. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. 
 73. See Eisenberg & Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum, supra 
note 31, at 2001–09 (using data to document the “flight” of merger agreements 
away from Delaware choice of law and forum). 
 74. Cf. id. at 1988 (“If Delaware’s efficient and skilled judges and 
procedures are part of the positive attraction of Delaware as a place of 
incorporation, as some claim, one expects Delaware to attract choice of law 
clauses disproportionately relative to other states.”). 
 75. See id. at 1994–95 (discussing the effect of various “variables—choice 
of law, state of incorporation, business locale, and attorney location—on law 
and forum choices”). 
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Instead, our premise is that a better way to understand how 
much lawyers value the default rules and judicial expertise 
under a state’s law would be to analyze the extent to which they 
(1) embrace the default rules of the state’s statutory framework 
and (2) defer to judicial interpretation of contractual terms 
based on the state’s forum. Lawyers crafting transaction 
agreements governed by state law with fewer undesirable 
defaults require less contracting around those defaults.76 
Lawyers drafting transaction agreements with forum selection 
clauses that place interpretation of contractual provisions in the 
hands of an expert judiciary (especially one without juries as in 
the Delaware Chancery Court) can rely on more open-ended, 
flexible standards rather than on detailed, rule-based 
provisions.77 
This article analyzes the extent to which M&A lawyers 
calibrate their contractual terms to the default rules of the law 
and forum selected. Both Delaware and other states are likely 
to have strengths and weaknesses in their default rules, leading 
the lawyers to draft different provisions calibrated to the law of 
each state.78 To the extent that there are systematic differences 
between states, we argue that they may reveal differences that 
lawyers perceive in default rules from state to state. If the 
substantive terms in M&A agreements do not appear to differ 
based on the legal regime governing the contract, then lawyers 
may perceive all states as having equal default rules (or equally 
disregarded default rules that they contract around), which 
would suggest that lawyers’ functional confidence in Delaware 
is no stronger than what they place in other jurisdictions. 
B. Empirical Strategy 
We are studying the extent of lawyers’ reliance on state 
default rules using the prism of merger agreements for the 
acquisition of public companies. We chose to analyze merger 
 
 76. See supra Part II.B. 
 77. See supra Part II.B.   
 78. See generally Michael P. Dooley & Michael D. Goldman, Some 
Comparisons Between the Model Business Corporation Act and the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 737 (2001) (comparing corporate law 
from several states with Delaware’s default rules). 
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agreements because they are highly negotiated agreements that 
do not follow standardized forms,79 which means lawyers are 
constantly confronted with the choice of relying on defaults or 
opting out by drafting precise terms.80 We chose public company 
merger agreements rather than private company agreements 
because public transactions provide access to richer set of 
control variables (e.g., transaction size and structure) than do 
private agreements.81 Additionally, U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission rules mandate the disclosure of all public 
company merger agreements, while the only private company 
merger agreements that the public is privy to typically involve 
acquisitions of or by public companies which cover only a portion 
of private company M&A activity.82 
We analyze two closely related hypotheses in this paper. 
The first is that to the extent default rules differ among states, 
the terms used in merger agreements should differ because the 
 
 79. Although academics and practitioners often describe public company 
M&A agreements as standardized, to the extent that is true it is as to the 
substance of provision categories, and not their form. Public company M&A 
agreements vary highly in terms of their form even when the initial draft 
comes from the same law firm. See Anderson & Manns, supra note 16, at 61 
(“[P]ublic merger agreement terms are not based off a common ‘form’ 
agreement, but rather are the product of an ‘evolution’ over many generations. 
This is true even within large law firms where drafts are based on prior 
agreements rather than standardized form language.”). 
 80. Public company merger agreements are among the most visible and 
high-profile documents in all of transactional legal practice, and therefore 
reflect the investment of considerable legal time and attention. See Using 
EDGAR to Research Investments, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://perma.cc
/HZ2G-5BUG (last updated Sept. 5, 2018) (noting that certain mergers and 
acquisitions must be disclosed when at least one of the companies is subject to 
SEC disclosure rules); see also Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business 
Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 243 (1984) 
(observing that corporate acquisition agreements are “among the highest 
forms of the business lawyer’s craft”). 
 81. See generally Vojislav Maksimovic et al., Private and Public Merger 
Waves, 68 J. FIN. 2177 (2013) (discussing the various factors that influence the 
acquisition behaviors of public and private firms). 
 82. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure rules provide 
access to over twelve thousand merger agreements from 1994 to 2014, 
providing a broad set of data to study. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 8-K 
4– 5, https://perma.cc/NPB4-P3NB (PDF) (requiring companies to disclose 
material definitive agreements outside of the ordinary course of business 
including merger agreements). 
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choice of law varies from state to state. The second is that to the 
extent that lawyers believe courts in different states are more 
or less sophisticated in addressing business law issues, the 
terms used in merger agreements should differ because the 
implications of forum selection vary from state to state because 
of the differences in the experience and quality of state 
judiciaries.83 In the majority of merger agreements, however, 
the forum chosen is the same as the state law chosen, so we have 
only a limited ability to distinguish between the two concepts.84 
Therefore, although we present results for both variables, we 
focus primarily on the choice of law, which is less susceptible to 
selection bias as we discuss below.85 
The law and economics literature on contracts generally 
predicts that better default rules and more expert courts will 
lead to shorter and more open-ended contracts.86 Drafting 
contracts is costly, and the cost increases with the number of 
terms in the agreement.87 Covering more contingencies results 
in more terms, meaning that the more complete the contract the 
more costly it is to draft.88 At some point, the cost of addressing 
 
 83. The focus of this Article is on the implications of the choice of forum 
in drafting when choosing between the specialized business court in 
Delaware—the Court of Chancery—and the non-specialized court systems of 
most other states. Future research could look at the equally intriguing 
implications of choice of forum on drafting in considering other differences 
between state judiciaries, such as elected versus appointed judiciaries. See, 
e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the 
Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 729–48 (1995) (discussing the potential 
distorting effects of elections for judges in many states on judicial 
decision-making). 
 84. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Miller, Flight to New York, supra note 31, at 
1505 (“Contracts overwhelmingly specify the place of choice of law as the 
choice of forum.”); Eisenberg & Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum, 
supra note 31, at 1981 (“If a particular state’s law is chosen, that state’s forum 
is also very likely to be selected.”); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in 
the American Courts in 2015: Twenty-Ninth Annual Survey, 64 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 221, 239 (2016) (observing that choice of law clauses and forum selection 
clauses “almost always” select the same jurisdiction). 
 85. See infra Part V. 
 86. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. 
 87. See supra Part II.B. 
 88. See supra Part II.B. 
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farfetched contingencies is no longer worth the benefit, 
preventing contracts from being completely contingent.89 
There are many law and economics accounts of costly 
contract drafting, and almost all of them predict longer, more 
detailed contracts will result from undesirable default rules or 
less competent courts.90 To make our analysis more concrete, 
however, we take as our basic starting point the specific model 
developed by Steven Shavell on contractual completeness.91 
Shavell models the parties’ choice among (1) specific terms, (2) 
general terms, and (3) gaps in writing a contract.92 Specific 
terms express the parties’ intended outcome in individual 
contingencies, and therefore are certain to produce the desired 
result, but are costly to write.93 General terms express the 
parties’ intent as to a group of contingencies, and are less costly 
to write but may result in incorrect interpretation.94 Gaps in 
contracts are contingencies not addressed in the contract at all, 
and are cheapest, yet represent a conscious or unconscious 
decision to leave interpretation of these issues to the court.95 
[The model is based on the basic idea that] the more closely 
the courts’ interpreted contracts resemble the parties’ true 
wishes, the more willing the parties are to leave gaps and 
write fairly general terms, whereas the parties are more 
willing to take extra pains to write more detailed contracts 
when courts refrain from interpreting terms or interpret 
terms in ways that run counter to their true desires.96 
Because the cost of writing specific terms is higher than 
gaps or general terms, parties will write more specific terms to 
 
 89. The notion that contracts were not completely contingent because of 
the cost of writing contracts has existed in economics literature for many 
decades. However, the more recent literature explicitly modeling the cost of 
contract drafting has developed more recently. See, e.g., Ronald A. Dye, 
Optimal Length of Labor Contracts, 26 INT’L ECON. REV. 251, 251–52 (1985) 
(presenting one of the first models of the cost of contracting). 
 90. See supra Part II. 
 91. See generally Steven Shavell, On the Writing and Interpretation of 
Contracts, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 289 (2006). 
 92. Id. at 295. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 290. 
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the extent that they are concerned that the courts would reach 
aberrant interpretations otherwise.97 Thus, the stronger the 
track record and reputation of the state judicial system, the 
fewer terms one would expect, and the shorter the contract the 
parties would write to economize on drafting costs.98 
The analysis above leads to the prediction that contracts 
will be shorter and more open-ended when the default rules are 
better and the courts that would enforce the contract are more 
competent.99 This is the specific prediction in other incomplete 
contract theory papers in the law and economics literature.100 
We combine this prediction from the law and economics 
literature with the nearly universal consensus among M&A 
lawyers that Delaware has higher quality law and courts.101 
Taken together, we would expect that these two hypotheses 
would translate into M&A contracts that are shorter and more 
open-ended when subject to Delaware choice of law or forum 
than when subject to other states’ laws or courts. 
To evaluate this hypothesis, we initially determine the 
number and complexity of the terms in the agreements with a 
very simple measure—the number of words in the 
agreements.102 Although the number of words is a simple proxy 
for the number of terms, it is strongly correlated with the 
complexity and detail of the contract.103 More detailed and 
precise instructions covering a greater number of contingencies 
require more words, even if carefully described in the most 
parsimonious language.104 Open-ended standards, rather than 
rules, are able to economize on words by using phrases such as 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See supra notes 91–98 and accompanying text. 
 100. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 4, at 1593 (“[C]ontracts are likely to be 
shorter the more competent the judges are because lawyers will not have to 
spell out everything for a dim interpreter.”). 
 101. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the 
Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1212–14 (2001) 
(discussing broad consensus about perceived advantages of Delaware 
corporate law and the Delaware judiciary).   
 102. See infra Part IV. 
 103. See infra Part IV. 
 104. See supra Part II.B. 
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“reasonable,” “good faith,” or “best efforts,” whereas rule-like 
contract terms require more words.105 Thus, we posit that the 
number of words is likely the most intuitive measure for 
drafting effort intended to overcome undesirable defaults or 
unskilled judicial interpreters. For example, Alan Schwartz and 
Joel Watson specifically suggested the number of words as a 
proposed measure for empirical tests of their theory on 
contractual interpretation.106 
Our basic prediction, which we test in Part IV, below, is 
whether parties view Delaware’s law and courts as providing 
sufficient benefit over those of other states to allow parties to 
economize on the number of terms, measured by the number of 
words in the agreements. 
IV. Data and Methods 
A The Data 
We gathered our dataset of public company mergers from 
Mergerstat which is available through LexisNexis.107 The data 
include mergers involving public company targets announced 
between 2001 and 2014 inclusive. For each transaction, the 
Mergerstat data provide information on the announcement 
date, deal size, type of consideration, SIC codes of the acquirer 
and target, the type of transaction (tender offer, leveraged 
buyout, etc.) as well as the law firms involved. We use these 
variables as controls in the analysis. 
The Mergerstat data do not include the text of the relevant 
agreements, so we then used a computer script to match merger 
agreements from the EDGAR system with the transactions in 
 
 105. See supra Part II.B. 
 106. See Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, Conceptualizing Contractual 
Interpretation, 42 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 32 (2013) (“One can measure contract length 
by the number of words.”). Of course, other proxies are possible, such as the 
number of sections or subsections. However, transactional drafts often 
combine multiple (identical) sections into one or break single sections into 
multiple sections, which would give different numbers of terms for the same 
exact text. Therefore, we consider such divisions somewhat arbitrary 
compared to the number of words. 
 107. See generally Finding Merger and Acquisition Information on 
Lexis.com and Nexis, LEXISNEXIS,  https://perma.cc/BQ2K-8LU7. 
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the Mergerstat database.108 This allows us to analyze the 
detailed text of each agreement and its relationship to 
transaction variables in the database. We were able to match a 
total of 1,569 agreements to the approximately 2,869 
transactions in the Mergerstat database.109 We excluded five 
transactions that involved bankruptcy reorganizations, and 
another six transactions with missing data, yielding a total of 
1,558 observations. 
For each transaction, we reviewed the relevant agreement 
and hand coded the state of incorporation of the acquirer and 
target, whether the merger involved a triangular merger 
structure, as well as the states of incorporation of any merger 
subsidiaries. We also coded the relevant choice of governing law 
for the agreement and the exclusive forum selected, if any.110 
These pieces of data provide the key variables of interest in 
analyzing the relative effect of choice of law and forum on the 
text of the agreements. 
The dependent variable in the analysis is the number of 
words in each agreement. We used a computer script to 
download the 1,558 agreements, remove punctuation and 
capital letters, remove exhibits and annexes, and remove tables 
 
 108. See Archive Indices of the SEC EDGAR Database, SEC, 
https://perma.cc/KD5E-2Z5G.  
 109. The computer program located the agreements using the names and 
dates in the Mergerstat data. The agreements were then hand-verified to 
ensure they were correctly matched. In some cases, the script did not locate 
the agreements, accounting for the difference between the size of the 
Mergerstat database and our data. We believe the missing agreements are 
missing at random and would not affect our results.   
 110. Forum selection clauses commonly come in two types, exclusive (or 
mandatory) clauses that specify a forum in which the parties must bring 
actions and non-exclusive (or permissive) clauses that specify a forum in which 
the parties may bring actions. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection 
Agreements in the Federal Courts after Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for 
Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55, 56 n.1 (1992) (defining exclusive 
clauses as “an agreement to litigate only in a forum or fora, to the exclusion of 
any other fora” and non-exclusive clauses as “an agreement to litigate in the 
agreed forum or fora, but not to the exclusion of any other fora that have 
jurisdiction and venue”). A variety of other terms are also used for these 
categories. See id. (“Some civilian commentators use the term ‘derogation 
agreement’ to describe exclusive forum agreements, ‘prorogation agreement’ 
to describe non-exclusive forum agreements.”). 
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of contents. The script then counted the number of words, and 
we stored the text of the agreements for further analysis below. 
The descriptive statistics for the dataset are displayed in 
Table 1 below. As suggested by the Table, our analysis will 
control for various elements of the deal structure, law firms 
involved, and industry of the target company, as described more 
fully in the next Part.111 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable Mean Median Standard 
Dev 
Number of Words 36,308.6 35,651.5 8,447.0 
State of Incorporation 
of Target = DE 
0.62.7 1 0.484 
Choice of Law = DE 0.691 1 0.462 
Choice of Forum = DE 0.610 1 0.488 
Target Incorporation = 
DE 
0.627 1 0.484 
Acquirer Incorporation 
= DE 
0.549 1 0.498 
Triangular Merger 
Structure 
0.873 1 0.333 
Deal Size $2.3 billion $702 million $5.5 billion 
Tender Offer 0.179 0 0.384 
Stock Consideration 0.442 0 0.497 
LBO 0.111 0 0.314 
Top 20 Firm Buyer 0.448 0 0.498 
Top 20 Firm Seller 0.671 1 0.470 
Banking Industry 0.101 0 0.301 
REIT Industry 0.096 0 0.295 
 
The number of words in the merger agreements showed 
strong evidence of trends over time. The length of M&A 
agreements increased substantially over our approximately 
fifteen-year window, adding hundreds of words per year on 
 
 111. See infra Part V. 
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average as shown in Panel A of Figure 1, below.112 However, the 
distribution of the number of words in the agreements was 
distributed approximately normally with only a slight positive 
skew, as shown in Panel B of Figure 1. Accordingly, we include 
a time trend in our analysis below to account for the growth in 
agreements over time. The approximate normality of the 
dependent variable (words per agreement) allows us to use 
ordinary least squares and no transformation is necessary to 









 112. See Anderson & Manns, supra note 15, at 232 (providing an overview 
of the growth of M&A agreements over time).   
 113. The dependent variable in this model (words per agreement) is 
technically a “count” variable and therefore cannot be less than zero and can 
only assume integer values. In many cases, count variables require special 
models because they are not normally distributed. Panel B of Figure 1 shows 
(and our statistical tests confirm) that the number of words per agreement is 
approximately normally distributed, eliminating the need for a model 
designed for count data. 
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Figure 1. The Number of Words in Merger Agreements. Panel A (left) shows 
the growth over time. Panel B (right) shows the distribution of the number of 
words in the agreements. 
As one might expect, the data confirm that choice of law is 
correlated strongly with choice of forum. In most cases, the 
choice of law and choice of forum were the same (and in most 
cases both choices were Delaware). The association between 
choice of law and choice of forum is set forth in Table 2A, below. 
Although all merger agreements contained a choice of law 
clause, roughly 17 percent of agreements did not contain a 
choice of forum clause. Similarly, the choice of law was highly 
correlated with the target’s state of incorporation, as shown in 
Table 2B, below. Table 2C shows that choice of forum is also 
highly correlated with state of incorporation of the target 
company. However, choice of forum is not found in all 
agreements as is choice of law, and Delaware companies are 
much more likely to choose exclusive forums than are other 
companies, which creates a possible selection bias discussed in 
Part V. 
 
Table 2A. Association Between Choice of Law and Choice of 
Forum. 
 DE Choice of 
Forum 
Other Choice of 
Forum 
No Choice of 
Forum 
DE Choice of 
Law 
933 35 108 
Other Choice 
of Law 
17 312 153 
 
 
Table 2B. Association Between Choice of Law and Target State of 
Incorporation. 
 Target Incorporated in 
Delaware 
Target Not Incorporated 
in Delaware 
DE Choice of 
Law 
906 71 
Other Choice 170 411 
  




Table 2C. Association Between Target State of Incorporation and 
Choice of Forum. 








813 65 99 
Other 
Incorporation 
137 282 162 
 
B. Two Approaches to Analyzing Delaware’s Defaults 
We performed two distinct types of analysis on the merger 
agreements. First, we modeled the number of terms in the 
agreement using the length of the agreements in words. As 
explained above, the more closely parties adhere to default 
rules, the less text is necessary.114 Similarly, the more 
predictable and sophisticated the decisions of the tribunal 
selected in the agreement’s forum selection clause are, the less 
text is necessary to guide the tribunal.115 Therefore, we model 
the length of the agreement by choice of law and choice of forum 
with suitable control variables. Because choice of law and choice 
of forum are closely correlated, we examine them separately 
initially and then together.116 
We then performed a second type of analysis using 
classification of the agreement text itself. It is possible that the 
number of words in a document may not reveal all the 
differences between default rules. Documents may vary based 
on choice of law or choice of forum in ways that do not 
systematically translate into longer or shorter documents.117 
Therefore, we also use machine-learning techniques to analyze 
the documents to look for systematic variations by choice of law 
or choice of forum. Specifically, we use a Random Forest 
 
 114. See supra Parts II.B, III.B. 
 115. See supra Parts II.B, III.B. 
 116. See infra Part V. 
 117. See supra Part IV.A. 
  
1228 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1197 (2020) 
 
classifier to attempt to predict Delaware choice of law versus 
non-Delaware choice of law.118 This analysis is designed to 
reveal the most “important” words that distinguish Delaware 
from non-Delaware agreements. 
We use two very different approaches to analyzing the effect 
of Delaware law to ensure we have multiple vantage points on 
the differences in Delaware law and forum. Because each 
approach uses different methodology (and to some extent 
different data), we describe the methodology and results 
together for each result one-by-one in Part V. 
V. Analysis and Results 
A. Regression Analysis of Document Length 
Our regression analysis attempts to analyze the association 
between the number of words in M&A agreements and our 
jurisdictional variables and control variables. Accordingly we 
use the number of words in each agreement as the dependent 
variable in a linear model and use least squares to estimate the 
relationship with our variables of interest.119 The key 
independent variables of interest are the choice of law (dummy 
variable for Delaware versus non-Delaware) and the choice of 
forum (dummy variable for Delaware versus non-Delaware). 
These two (choice of law and choice of forum) are highly 
correlated,120 so we will present separate regressions for each, 
as well as their connection to the target’s and acquirer’s state(s) 
of incorporation. 
We include a number of control variables in the analysis to 
account for two types of potentially confounding effects. First, 
some variables are known to affect the length of merger 
agreements. In particular, merger agreements where the 
 
 118. Random Forests use an ensemble of decision trees to make 
predictions. See, e.g., David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What 
Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
653, 681–83 (2017) (discussing how machine-learning algorithms can be used 
to construct educated guesses about missing values in data sets). 
 119. See DOUGLAS C. MONTGOMERY, ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 14–16 (3d ed. 2001) (providing an explanation of least 
squares regression).  
 120. See supra Tables 2A–C. 
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consideration includes stock are lengthier than those where the 
consideration is solely cash because of the need for more 
deal-specific and securities related provisions, so we introduce a 
variable for whether the transaction is cash only.121 Banking 
merger agreements are also often shorter than other merger 
agreements, in part because of a common practice of the 
acquirer and target making the same representations and 
warranties.122 In addition, real estate investment trusts often 
have longer merger agreements because they often have more 
complex corporate structures including operating partnerships 
that require multiple layers of mergers.123 Accordingly, we 
include dummy variables for two industry groups represented 
in the data, banking (SIC codes beginning with sixty)124 and real 
estate investment trusts (SIC groups beginning with 
sixty-seven).125 Finally, the length of agreements has increased 
over time.126 Some commentators argue this is the result of 
textual accumulation over time,127 while others argue it may 
relate to rational responses to a changed environment.128 In 
either case, we use year fixed effects to control for this possible 
confounding variable. 
 
 121. The principal reason for the difference is that representations and 
warranties on the part of the acquirer are much more extensive in a stock 
transaction than in a cash transaction. 
 122. See, e.g., Zions Bancorporation, Agreement and Plan of Merger Dated 
July 5, 2005, SEC, https://perma.cc/9FYZ-V7YB (setting forth a single Article 
V on reciprocal representations and warranties of both parties). 
 123. See infra Tables 3–5. 
 124. Previous work has shown that merger agreements in the banking 
industry are more closely related to one another than other types of 
agreements, and as a result are textually different from other agreements. See 
Anderson & Manns, supra note 16, at 73 (noting patterns in use of firm 
precedent). 
 125. The results were similar when we incorporated control variables for 
all two-digit SIC codes. 
 126. See supra Figure 1. 
 127. See Anderson & Manns, supra note 16, at 76 (discussing the growth 
of the median word count of merger agreements over time). 
 128. See John C. Coates IV, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence 
from Twenty Years of Deals 2 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working 
Paper No. 333, 2016), https://perma.cc/B2PH-AQRF (PDF) (describing types of 
“rational responses”). 
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The second category of controls relates to “deal complexity.” 
We include these controls because more complex deals may be 
correlated with both longer agreements and Delaware choice of 
law or forum. Accordingly, we include controls for the logged 
equity value of the deal, on the theory that larger deals might 
have longer merger agreements.129 We also include controls for 
major deal structure elements, such as whether the transaction 
involves a tender offer or a leveraged buyout—structures that 
may introduce drafting complexities.130 Finally, we include a 
dummy variable for whether the seller’s law firm was a “Top 20” 
M&A firm and the buyer’s law firm was a “Top 20” M&A firm,131 
on the theory that more complex deals may involve more active 
M&A firms or that more active M&A firms may include more 
detail in agreements. Finally, we include a control for whether 
the structure of the merger is triangular or direct, as triangular 
mergers typically entail extra verbiage in the merger agreement 
to account for the complexities of the three-party deal 
structure.132 
The first set of results is presented in Table 3, below. In 
Table 3 we present models for the relevant Delaware variables 
by themselves in Model 1, then together with transaction 
controls added in Model 2, then with industry controls added in 
Model 3. The choice of forum and target state of incorporation 
 
 129. For the total value of the deal we used Mergerstat’s “Base Equity 
Price” data point. See FACTSET MERGERSTAT, MERGERSTAT REVIEW (2020) (on 
file with author).  
 130. See infra Tables 3–6. 
 131. We ascertained the “top 20” firms from the most common firms 
appearing in the dataset. The “top 20” firms were, in order, Skadden, Arps, 
Slate, Meagher & Flom; Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz; Latham & Watkins; 
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett; Sullivan & Cromwell; Cravath, Swaine & Moore; 
Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell; Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati; Cleary 
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton; Jones Day; Weil, Gotshal & Manges; Hogan 
Lovells; Davis Polk & Wardwell; Shearman & Sterling; Baker Botts; Gibson, 
Dunn & Crutcher; Goodwin Procter; Morgan, Lewis & Bockius; O’Melveny & 
Myers; and Ropes & Gray. We also ran the regression with individual dummy 
variables for these firms, which did not change the results materially. We 
apologize in advance to partners and associates at “Top 20” firms who did not 
make the cut as we are just focusing on M&A transactions and volume of M&A 
deals rather than quality or dollar amount of transactions as is often the focus 
of other M&A law firm rankings.   
 132. See infra Tables 3–6. 
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are highly correlated with the choice of law. Therefore, the key 
variable of interest in our analysis (choice of law) is also 


















Table 3. Modeling Agreement Length by Choice of Law, Choice of 
Forum, and Incorporation 

















































































































































 R-Squared 0.049 0.3551 0.3676 0.3642 
 Adjusted 
R-Squared 
0.046 0.3496 0.3614 0.3593 
 No. Observations 1558 1558 1558 1558 
 Standard errors reported in parentheses. 
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 95%, 99%, and 
99.9% levels, respectively. 
 
 
The Table reveals some interesting findings regarding the 
relationship of Delaware law to agreement length. Delaware 
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choice of law is associated with a statistically significant 
increase in the length of the agreements, and that is true across 
all the specifications in Models 1–4, regardless of the controls 
introduced. In terms of magnitude, the choice of Delaware law 
is associated with approximately 1000–2000 additional words in 
the merger agreements, depending on the control variables 
included in the model. This result is the opposite of the 
incomplete contract theory prediction that high-quality 
Delaware law would allow drafters to rely on defaults and 
economize on detailed terms.133 
The control variables offer some expected results and some 
surprises. As was expected, agreements increase steadily in 
length as time passes, adding about one thousand words per 
year.134 Stock transactions are very strongly associated with 
longer agreements, primarily because of the lengthier 
representations and warranties of the acquirer in a stock 
transaction. Tender offers and leveraged buyouts (LBO) are 
associated with longer agreements, as one might expect given 
the increased complexity. The logged transaction size was 
strongly positively associated with longer agreements, as 
drafting effort is proportionately less costly on a larger 
transaction. Direct (as opposed to triangular) merger structures 
saved about three thousand words, as the mechanics of these 
transactions are less complex. 
The results for some of the control variables are surprising, 
however. In particular, the identity of the law firms did not 
appear to significantly affect the length of the agreements when 
other variables were controlled. This is surprising because one 
might expect that more prominent M&A firms would be 
retained in more complex deals, and that more complex deals 
would involve longer agreements. Indeed, the coefficients on the 
“Top 20” M&A firms were positive and significant in an 
(unreported) model in which transaction size was not controlled. 
However, controlling for transaction size almost completely 
neutralized this effect, suggesting that the transaction size 
control is capable of controlling for almost all “deal complexity” 
 
 133. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 134. See supra Figure 1. 
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effects.135 The fact that the more prominent M&A firms do not 
seem independently associated with agreement length helps to 
alleviate the concern that some other confounding variable 
related to deal complexity accounts for the main results. 
Digging deeper into the key Delaware variables of interest, 
there are a few broad observations and a few more specific ones. 
First, the Table makes it clear that the target’s state of 
incorporation, choice of law, and choice of forum coefficients all 
have relatively small magnitudes compared to some of the other 
variables. The state of the acquirer’s incorporation was not 
associated with differences in the lengths of the agreements at 
all. 
Second, the Delaware choice of forum variable is not 
significant and even switches sign as control variables are 
added. On the one hand, choice of forum and choice of law are 
correlated. Indeed, the choice of forum is, to a large extent, a 
subset of the choice of law because all agreements in the dataset 
selected governing law but not all selected an exclusive forum. 
As a result, when the choice of forum was included in an 
unreported regression separately (without choice of law) it had 
a positive and statistically significant sign (associated with 
more words). However, as the control variables were added to 
that regression, the magnitude of that coefficient and its 
statistical significance declined. This suggests that Delaware 
choice of forum, to the extent it is associated with anything 
beyond choice of law, is merely a signal for increased deal 
complexity. This is further bolstered by the fact in Table 3 that 
deals that fail to choose a forum are about 3,600 words shorter 
when deal complexity controls are not included, but only about 
1,900 words shorter when those controls are included. In 
contrast, Delaware choice of law continued to have an 
association with longer agreements regardless of the control 
variables added. 
A second point about the effect of the choice of Delaware law 
is that its association with longer agreements is reduced for 
target companies incorporated in Delaware. Of course, the 
target’s state of incorporation is strongly associated with both 
Delaware choice of law and Delaware choice of forum. Although 
 
 135. See infra Part VI.B.2. 
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an agreement for the acquisition of a Delaware target can (and 
sometimes does) choose law or forum other than Delaware, in 
most cases the state of target incorporation and the choice of law 
are the same, as is the exclusive forum if one is selected.136 
Although the target state of incorporation, choice of law, and 
choice of forum are highly correlated, they are not perfectly 
correlated. 
The result that Delaware choice of law is associated with a 
smaller increase of words for Delaware companies than for 
non-Delaware companies is a potentially interesting one. 
Approximately one-third of the transactions in the database are 
“All Delaware” in the sense that they involved a target and 
acquirer incorporated in Delaware, a Delaware choice of law, 
and a Delaware choice of forum. Accordingly, we present a table 
that compares the results of “All Delaware” merger agreements 
versus other merger agreements. Table 4 below shows how the 




Table 4. Modeling Agreement Length by “All Delaware” Status. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 







































 136. See generally supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing 
factors influencing forum choice). 
  
























 Banking Industry   -2813.0*** 
(733.4) 
 REIT Industry   1568.8* 
(697.4) 
 R-Squared 0.040 0.349 0.362 
 Adjusted 
R-Squared 
0.039 0.345 0.357 
 No. Observations 1558 1558 1558 
 Standard errors reported in parentheses. 
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 95%, 99%, and 99.9% levels, 
respectively. 
 
The “All Delaware” variable is significant only in Model 1, 
and is positive but not significant in Models 2 and 3. However, 
even in Model 3 where the effect is not statistically significant 
and smallest, the confidence interval for the “All Delaware” 
coefficient is -386.9 to 1,183.2. The fact that the coefficient is not 
significant means we cannot reject with 95 percent confidence 
the hypothesis that “All Delaware” has no effect on the number 
of words in the agreement. However, the standard error is small 
enough that we can reject with 95 percent confidence the 
hypothesis that “All Delaware” deals reduce the number of 
words more than 386.9 (or increase them more than 1,183.2). In 
other words, although it is possible in this analysis that “All 
Delaware” deals are associated with slightly shorter 
agreements, such an effect, if any, is small. In other words, this 
result still supports the notion that Delaware law does not offer 
any substantial drafting advantage over the law of other states, 
even in the model most favorable to finding such an advantage. 
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The above analysis demonstrates that the Delaware choice 
of law is not associated with shorter agreements, and indeed 
most of the models associated Delaware choice of law with 
longer agreements. However, one might still question whether 
the analysis definitively establishes no drafting advantage to 
Delaware law. For example, despite the controls used in the 
above analysis, it is possible the Delaware agreements reflect 
greater transaction complexity that we have not adequately 
controlled for. The fact that the most prominent M&A firms do 
not affect document length tends to minimize this concern. 
Fortunately, we do not need to rely entirely on that fact, as we 
have a very powerful additional control variable we can 
introduce—the length of the precedent agreement on which 
each deal was likely based.137 By controlling for the length of the 
precedent agreement, we can control for most of the residual 
factors that might influence agreement length.138 
We are able to control for the length of the document used 
as a precedent for each transaction because of a prior analysis 
we performed on the evolution of merger agreements.139 In that 
study we used computer analysis to identify the most likely 
precedent agreement for each public company acquisition 
agreement in a broader 1994–2014 data set and showed that 
most M&A agreements can be traced to their precedent 
documents.140 Using the results from the previous analysis we 
identified the most likely precedent agreement in our dataset 
and determined the number of words in each such precedent. In 
Table 5, below, we add a variable for the number of words in the 
precedent agreements (where they could be found). Table 5 
below presents the full models from Table 3 and Table 4 with 
the additional variable of precedent length added. 
 
 137. See infra Table 5. 
 138. See infra Table 5.  
 139. See, e.g., Anderson & Manns, supra note 16, at 66 (showing the high 
degree of editorial churning on a macro-level for acquisition agreements); 
Anderson & Manns, supra note 15, at 222–25 (highlighting the high degree of 
textual changes within the micro-level of the text of boilerplate terms in M&A 
acquisition agreements, which reinforces the editorial churning hypothesis). 
 140. See generally Anderson & Manns, supra note 14 (discussing how 
insights about macro-level agreement drift suggest potential pathways to 
greater efficiency in M&A drafting). 
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Table 5. Choice of Law, Forum, and Incorporation with Control for 
Precedent Length. 
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 R-Squared 0.557 0.554 0.553 
 Adjusted 
R-Squared 
0.552 0.550 0.550 
 No. Observations 1542 1542 1542 
 Standard errors reported in parentheses. 
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 95%, 99%, and 99.9% 
levels, respectively. 
 
The introduction of this variable increases the fit of the 
model substantially, as the length of the precedent used 
strongly predicts the length of the agreement. However, the 
other variables remain largely unchanged. Delaware choice of 
law continues to be a significant and positive predictor of longer 
agreements when isolated as a standalone variable (columns 1 
and 3). The “All Delaware” agreement variable continues to be 
positive, although it loses its significance in Model 2. Thus, the 
key finding of the difference in length for Delaware choice of law 
remained statistically significant even when we accounted for 
the differences in the length of the precedent starting points for 
the drafting of the acquisition agreements. 
Next, we turn to another possible objection to our 
conclusion that Delaware law does not enable shorter 
agreements. The overall length of agreements is predicted to 
vary by the quality of law and tribunals in the law and 
economics literature,141 but it is possible our analysis has not 
homed in on the “important” aspects of the agreements. Our 
analysis thus far has documented the overall increases (or at 
least no decreases) in the length of Delaware acquisition 
agreements, but it is possible that the important parts of 
 
 141. See supra Part II.B. 
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agreements are shorter when Delaware law governs, and that 
we failed to detect those differences. In particular, it is possible 
that the superiority of Delaware law allows shorter, more 
open-ended terms in the important deal terms, but that those 
important deal terms are swamped by lengthier boilerplate 
provisions in the Delaware agreements. 
In order to address this issue, we now perform the same 
word-count analysis on one specific provision that is highly 
negotiated and closely studied in M&A—the material adverse 
change (MAC) clause (also referred to as material adverse 
effect—“MAE”) definition.142 The MAC clause is an important 
one from the standpoint of the literature on contract design, 
 
 142. See generally Choi & Triantis, supra note 4 (arguing that before 
closing the deal, the intentional vagueness of MAC clauses creates more 
efficient incentives for the seller, rather than more precise and less costly 
proxies); Yair Y. Galil, MAC Clauses in a Materially Adversely Changed 
Economy, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 846 (2002) (discussing how unclear 
judicial interpretations of the contours of MAC clauses and MAE clauses cast 
a shadow over merger deals); Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, 
Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
330 (2005) (using economic modeling to analyze the role that MAC and MAE 
clauses play in the structure of the standard acquisition agreement and the 
incentive effects for acquirers and targets); Robert T. Miller, Canceling the 
Deal: Two Models of Material Adverse Change Clauses in Business 
Combination Agreements, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 99 (2009) (advocating a judicial 
framework for interpreting MAC clauses that places the burden of material 
changes on targets and the burden of immaterial changes on acquirers during 
the closing period); Robert T. Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating 
Risk Through MAC Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2007 (2009) (arguing that the reciprocal allocations of deal risk 
in MAC clauses serve to further efficiency in transactions by decreasing the 
likelihood that parties will exercise termination rights); Alan Schwartz & 
Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926 (2010) 
(arguing for interpretative default rules in construing MAC clauses); Andrew 
A. Schwartz, A “Standard Clause Analysis” of the Frustration Doctrine and the 
Material Adverse Change Clause, 57 UCLA L. REV. 789 (2010) (arguing that 
MAC clauses transform conventional default rules by (1) allowing a 
contractual exit in cases of frustration of secondary purposes or partial loss of 
value and (2) shifting exogenous risk from the acquirer to the target); Eric L. 
Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Contractual Conditions, 34 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 755 (2009) (arguing that MAE clauses are a tool for allocating the 
risk of market uncertainty present while negotiating the acquisition 
agreement). 
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having been front and center in one of the leading articles.143 
The clause is uniquely suited for testing these hypotheses, 
because it is one of the most important moving pieces in the 
merger agreement, and yet relies to a large extent on the 
background or default rules of state law.144 
We collected the textual definitions for “material adverse 
effect” for the 1,382 agreements in our database for which such 
definitions were available.145 We then analyzed the word counts 
for these MAC definitions using the same variables as we used 
in Tables 3 and 4 above. The MAC definitions were reasonably 
normally distributed and symmetric like the documents as a 
whole, with mean of 377.2 words, median of 363, and standard 
deviation of 167.7. 
 
Table 6. Modeling Length of Material Adverse Effect Definition. 










 Constant -148.0 -139.7** -152.2 

















 Delaware Choice of 19.4  19.0* 
 
 143. See, e.g., Choi & Triantis, supra note 4, at 852–54 (using the MAC 
clause as an illustration of the tradeoff between vagueness and drafting costs 
in the context of contract design). 
 144. See Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 142, at 357–58 (discussing how 
MAC clauses manage transaction risk without court input). 
 145. We collected the definitions with a computer script and then checked 
them manually. In some cases, the outer bounds of the “definition” were 
unclear, so we used a rule that each definition could consist of one sentence 
only. In the vast majority of cases, that rule captured the entire definition, but 
in some cases it excluded text that was arguably part of the definition but 
contained in a separate sentence. 
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Law (14.1) (8.3) 









































































 R-Squared 0.394 0.392 0.393 
 Adjusted 
R-Squared 
0.387 0.387 0.388 
 No. Observations 1382 1382 1382 
 Standard errors reported in parentheses. 
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 95%, 99%, and 99.9% levels, 
respectively. 
 
The results in this Table, based on the length of MAC 
clauses, parallel those above based on the length of entire 
agreements for our key variables of interest.146 Delaware choice 
 
 146. See supra Table 6. 
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of law is positive in all models and significant when the highly 
correlated other Delaware variables are excluded. In Models 1 
and 2 where the Delaware choice of law and “All Delaware” 
variables are not significant, the confidence intervals reduce 
any possible “Delaware effect” to a narrow range—literally 
single digit numbers of words for a definition averaging nearly 
400 words. Thus, the analysis on individual MAC definitions 
parallels that for agreements as a whole. The only interesting 
difference is that the use of stock consideration in a merger 
leads to substantially shorter MAC definitions, whereas it leads 
to substantially longer agreements as a whole. 
This analysis of MAC clauses confirms the findings based 
on entire agreements—that the choices of Delaware law and 
courts do not enable drafters to economize on contractual 
language.147 Both agreements as a whole148 and MAC clauses in 
particular do not differ significantly in length based on 
Delaware choice of law or choice of forum. Indeed, Delaware 
choice of law in particular is generally associated with an 
increased number of words in the agreements compared to 
reliance on the law and courts of other states. 
The results of our analysis above suggest that Delaware law 
or forum is not a substitute for contractual complexity. Our 
analysis does not necessarily demonstrate, however, that there 
are no important systematic differences between agreements 
drafted under Delaware and non-Delaware law. First, it is 
possible that our analysis based purely on the length of 
agreements in words may miss systematic differences between 
Delaware and non-Delaware agreements for a variety of 
reasons. Second, some of the economic models discussed above 
predicted that certain types of court sophistication may produce 
longer agreements, rather than shorter ones.149 These different 
types of sophistication could offset one another producing a zero 
net result. 
We therefore also perform some checks to examine the 
substance of the agreements themselves to determine how 
 
 147. See supra Tables 3–6. 
 148. See supra Tables 3–6.  
 149. See supra Part IV (discussing collected data and approaches to 
analyzing Delaware’s default rules). 
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Delaware agreements differ from agreements governed by the 
law or forum of other states. We do this in the next section, 
where we deploy machine-learning techniques to examine how 
Delaware agreements differ textually from non-Delaware 
agreements. 
B. Classification of Agreements Based on Textual Content 
In this section we go beyond word counts to examine the 
textual content of the merger agreements using computer-based 
statistical techniques. Our goal in this section is to determine 
whether there are textual features that differ systematically 
between Delaware and non-Delaware agreements that may not 
show up in overall word counts. To conduct this analysis, we use 
a Random Forest classifier to attempt to differentiate Delaware 
from non-Delaware agreements.150 If the classifier is able to 
reliably distinguish Delaware from non-Delaware agreements 
based on meaningful textual features, then we may have 
evidence that lawyers draft differently based on underlying law. 
If, however, the classifier is unable to distinguish between 
Delaware and non-Delaware agreements (or can distinguish 
only based on superficial features), that fact would support the 
conclusion from the agreement length analysis that lawyers do 
not draft significantly differently based on Delaware or 
non-Delaware law. 
 
 150. We also examined the documents’ content using Latent Dirichlet 
Allocation (LDA), a statistical technique developed specifically for modeling 
text documents. See David M. Blei, et al., Latent Dirichlet Allocation, 3 J. 
MACHINE LEARNING RES. 993, 996 (2003) (defining LDA as a “generative 
probabilistic model of a corpus”). We first perform an unsupervised LDA model 
on a larger set of merger agreements that include both public company and 
private company acquisitions. This larger set of documents is drawn from the 
dataset we developed in a previous article. See Anderson & Manns, supra note 
16, at 68–70 (collecting merger agreements filed with the SEC between 1994 
and 2014). The unsupervised model produced indistinct topics that failed to 
clearly distinguish between Delaware agreements and non-Delaware 
agreements. We then perform a supervised LDA model on the public company 
merger agreement set with Delaware choice of forum as the class. The 
supervised model has two classes, Delaware choice of law and non-Delaware 
choice of law. The results were similar when all states were treated as 
separate classes. The supervised model performed better, but still failed to 
clearly distinguish between Delaware and non-Delaware agreements. 
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For the Random Forest analysis, we randomly divided the 
agreements into a training set of 1,258 agreements and a test 
set of 300 agreements. We removed terms that existed in 
substantially all documents and terms that existed in very few 
documents (fewer than twenty) to eliminate many proper nouns 
and similar words. We also eliminated stop words and 
punctuation, as is standard in textual classification. 
The Random Forest classifier was able to predict Delaware 
choice of law with some degree of accuracy, as the following 
Table indicates. When the choice of law was actually Delaware, 
the classifier was correct 196 times and incorrect only 9 times. 
When the choice of law was actually a state other than 
Delaware, the classifier was correct 64 times and incorrect 31 
times. This is a typical result when one class (here Delaware) is 










Delaware Actual 196 9 
Non-Delaware Actual 31 64 
 
The initial results might suggest differential drafting 
between Delaware and non-Delaware. However, upon 
inspection of the individual words that predict Delaware versus 
non-Delaware, it is apparent that the prediction was largely 
based on relatively superficial characteristics of the documents. 
The strongest predictors of Delaware law were words such as 
“Delaware,” “DGCL” (the Delaware General Corporation Law), 
and “Chancery.” Below is a Table illustrating the fifteen most 
important words (in terms of Gini coefficient decrease) in 




























Table 8. Most Important Terms Predicting Delaware or 
Non-Delaware Incorporation 
   
Term Importance Direction 
delaware 19.97 Predicts Delaware 
Dgcl 17.56 Predicts Delaware 
Articles 9.51 Predicts 
Non-Delaware 
chancery 8.98 Predicts Delaware 
stockholder 8.68 Predicts Delaware 
stockholders 6.91 Predicts Delaware 
shareholder 5.89 Predicts 
Non-Delaware 
shareholders 5.01 Predicts 
Non-Delaware 
appraisal 3.32 Predicts Delaware 
Estate 2.76 Predicts 
Non-Delaware 
secretary 2.71 Predicts Delaware 
commonwealth 2.43 Predicts 
Non-Delaware 
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Hsr 2.02 Predicts Delaware 
maryland 1.95 Predicts 
Non-Delaware 
Reit 1.84 Predicts 
Non-Delaware 
 
As an example of the predictive power of these superficial 
terms, consider the word “Delaware” used in an agreement. 
Because so few companies are physically located in Delaware,151 
the primary reason for that word to appear in an agreement is 
because the agreement is governed by Delaware law or one of 
the companies is incorporated in Delaware (in which case the 
agreement is usually governed by Delaware law). As a result, 
the number of times the word “Delaware” appears in an 
agreement dramatically affects the probability the model 
predicts Delaware governing law, as illustrated in the figure 
below. 
 
 151. See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 5, at 389–91 (displaying the 
disparity in the number of publicly traded firms incorporated in Delaware and 
states with the largest number of publicly traded firms’ corporate 
headquarters). 
  





Of course, there are also words that strongly predict 
non-Delaware choice of law. As an example, the following figure 
shows the predictive effect of the number of times the word 
“shareholder” appears in an agreement. When “shareholder” 
does not appear in an agreement, the agreement is governed by 
Delaware law about 80 percent of the time. When the word 
“shareholder” appears more than ten times, the probability the 
agreement is governed by Delaware law drops to about 50 
percent. In Delaware, those who own shares of stock are 
generally referred to under the Delaware General Corporation 
Law as “stockholders,” while in most other state corporate codes 
such persons are referred to as “shareholders.” 
  





In contrast, the first arguably substantive term in the list 
of most important terms, “appraisal,” has a much smaller 
impact as shown in the Figure below.152 This is telling because 
the fact of appraisal for cash mergers under Delaware law is not 
even a default rule that the drafters can contract around; it is a 
mandatory rule to which the drafters must merely acquiesce.153 
 
 152. The term “appraisal” tends to predict Delaware law (really Delaware 
incorporation of the target company), because Delaware provides appraisal 
rights when cash is the consideration, which many states do not. See DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(2) (2019) (detailing stockholder appraisal rights). 
 153. But see Manti Holdings v. Authentix Acquisition Co., No. CV 
2017-0887-SG, 2019 WL 3814453, at *3 n.20 (Del. Ch. 2019)  
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Thus, the word likely does not reflect an effort to contract 




Overall, the results show that the Random Forest classifier 
was effective in distinguishing Delaware choice of law from 
non-Delaware choice of law, but did so largely based on 
superficial state-specific terminology, not based in substantive 
 
The [appraisal] right is mandatory, I presume, in that it exists for 
all stockholders of Delaware corporations by statute. It is not 
mandatory in that stockholders must pursue appraisal, or that an 
appraisal action must proceed in every instance in which statutory 
appraisal is permitted under the DGCL. To the contrary, 
stockholders must meet certain procedural requirements to invoke 
appraisal rights, and stockholders are deemed to have waived 
appraisal rights if those requirements are not satisfied. (citations 
omitted).  
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transactional terms. In other words, we found no evidence 
lawyers drafted different substantive terms under Delaware 
law, only that they adapted the merger agreements to the 
different terminology and mandatory terms of Delaware law. 
Accordingly, we ran another Random Forest classifier after 
having removed these superficial markers for Delaware or 









Terms Removed Explanation 
delaware, maryland, york, 
pennsylvania, massachusetts, 
texas, california, virginia, 
commonwealth, florida, indiana, 
nevada, jersey, minnesota, 
washington, carolina 
Names or partial names of 
states 
Articles The corporate charter is called 
“articles” of incorporation in 
most states and a “certificate” 
of incorporation in Delaware 
stockholders, shareholders, 
stockholder, shareholder 
The holders of stock are called 
“stockholders” in Delaware and 
“shareholders” in most other 
states 
dgcl, mgcl, bca, pbcl, tbca, sdat, 
department, cgcl, vsca, nybcl, 
nrs, fbca 
Names, parts of names, or 
abbreviations for various state 
corporation code and agencies 
chancery The trial court chosen in most 
Delaware choice of law 
provisions is the Court of 
Chancery 
secretary Delaware Secretary of State 
 
 154. See infra Table 10. 
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borough Common in exclusive forum 
provisions choosing New York 
courts 
southern Refers to Southern District of 
New York, common in 
provisions choosing New York 
Courts. 
manhattan Common in exclusive forum 
provisions choosing New York 
courts 
fdic, reit, hsr, banking, bank, 
deposits, deposit, banks, 
bancorp, antitrust, taxable, 
governors, frb, irs, hart, rodino, 
bhc, bancshares, leach, bliley, 
comptroller 
Words merely indicating 
industry or federal regulatory 
environment unrelated to state 
corporate law 
appraisal, adoption, dissenters Terms associated with 




Once the terms in Table 9 had been removed, we re-ran the 
Random Forest classifier and obtained the following results in 
Table 10. Although the classifier still performs better than 
random,155 it now predicts Delaware choice of law too often, and 
even predicts Delaware choice of law more often than not when 








 155. A null model would always predict Delaware choice of law as 
Delaware choice of law is the most common. It would have been correct 203 
times and incorrect 97 times. The actual Random Forest classifier with 
superficial predictive terms removed was correct 219 times and incorrect 81 
times. By way of comparison, before the removal of the superficial predictive 
terms the Random Forest classifier was correct 260 times and incorrect 40 
times, as indicated by Table 7. 
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Table 10. Random Forest Predictions after Removal of Superficial 
Terms 
 Delaware Predicted Non-Delaware 
Predicted 





Our results from this text classification parallel those from 
our regression analysis above.156 The selection of Delaware law 
does not translate into systematic differences in textual 
patterns relative to agreements selecting non-Delaware law.157 
This finding reinforces the thesis that lawyers do not draft 
significantly differently based on a reliance on Delaware or 
non-Delaware law and casts doubt on the claims of the 
distinctive appeal of Delaware’s legal framework and 
judiciary.158 Alternatively, as we discuss below, these findings 
may raise doubt about the completeness of the explanations 
underpinning incomplete contract theory.159 We do not see 
greater reliance on Delaware statutory and judicial defaults in 
contracting in spite of the confidence that lawyers appear to 
place in Delaware as the primary locus of incorporations and 
M&A litigation.160 
VI. Discussion 
A. The Results and Their Interpretation 
The key results from our analysis are twofold. First, 
lawyers do not appear to use reliance on Delaware law or 
Delaware courts as a substitute for detailed contractual 
terms.161 Delaware-governed agreements are no shorter and 
 
 156. See supra Part V.A. 
 157. See supra Table 10 (providing results of Random Forest predictions 
after removal of superficial terms). 
 158. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 159. See infra Part VI. 
 160. See infra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra Part V. 
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generally appear to be longer than agreements governed by the 
law of other states.162 Second, to the extent that there are 
systematic differences between Delaware and non-Delaware 
agreements, those differences relate primarily to relatively 
superficial differences in terminology between the states, not to 
substantive adaptations to different legal rules.163 
These findings have significant implications for contractual 
drafting and debates about the value of Delaware law. It 
suggests that there is a gap between the professed and revealed 
confidence in Delaware law and courts.164 Contrary to the praise 
that M&A lawyers frequently lavish on Delaware, lawyers 
appear to place no greater reliance on Delaware than 
non-Delaware defaults when engaged in drafting agreements.165 
The finding that acquisition agreements with Delaware choice 
of law are  statistically significantly longer in most of our models 
than their non-Delaware counterparts suggests that lawyers’ 
practical confidence in Delaware is no greater than the 
confidence that they place in other jurisdictions.166 Otherwise 
the Delaware agreements would be shorter as parties could rely 
on statutory provisions, judicial precedents, and reliable court 
interpretation to a greater extent to fill potential gaps in the 
agreement.167 Even the most favorable models for Delaware 
show that Delaware agreements are no shorter than their 
non-Delaware counterparts.168 This conclusion potentially calls 
into question the extent whether a “Delaware difference” in 
business law and adjudication exists and raises the issue of 
whether Delaware’s allure preeminence results entirely from 
 
 162. See supra Table 3 and proceeding discussion summarizing regression 
analysis results. 
 163. See supra Table 10 (displaying predictions of incorporation state after 
removal of superficial contract terms). 
 164. See, e.g., Carney, Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 17, at 134–42 
(pointing to survey data to argue that lawyers’ confidence in and reliance on 
Delaware corporate law is based both on Delaware’s reputation and lawyers’ 
ignorance of the alternative corporate law frameworks offered by other states). 
 165. For data underlying this assertion, see supra Part V. 
 166. See supra Part V.A. 
 167. See supra Part II.B. 
 168. See supra Part V.A. 
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substance rather than process—specifically path dependence.169 
The Delaware statutory and judicial defaults do not appear to 
matter in the contracting context where the added value of 
Delaware should shape lawyers’ decision-making.170 
An alternative, yet complementary conclusion is that the 
logic of incomplete contract theory may simply not correlate 
closely to the empirical reality of contractual drafting.171 M&A 
lawyers may not be calibrating the terms of public M&A 
contracts to economize on drafting by leveraging the existing 
statutory and judicial defaults in Delaware (or for the defaults 
for transactions grounded in other states’ law). This finding 
raises questions about the predictive power of the incomplete 
contract theory, as it may be that lawyers are either less aware 
of or responsive to legal defaults than incomplete contract 
theory expects they would be.172 Lawyers’ confidence in 
Delaware may be genuine as evidenced by the large extent to 
which lawyers steer incorporations and M&A litigation towards 
Delaware.173 But lawyers may be focused on other factors when 
it comes to legal drafting that leads to larger investments of 
time, money, and words in the drafting process. For example, 
every lawyer may feel he or she has to leave their mark on the 
agreement to justify their involvement (and billable hours), and 
idiosyncratic changes may have little to do with efforts to 
contract around defaults.174 This potential interpretation may 
 
 169. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 170. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 53, at 818 (offering a theory that 
contract design anticipates adversarial litigation); see also supra Part V.B 
(using data to show that the length of M&A agreements is not meaningfully 
affected by the selection of Delaware law). 
 171. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 53, at 817 (“Despite its theoretical 
advances . . . the theory of incomplete contracts has yet to yield predictions 
that are borne out by the realities of commercial practice.”). 
 172. See id. (discussing a gap between theory and practice). 
 173. See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 5, at 391, 420 (presenting data 
detailing Delaware’s dominance as the primary location of incorporation for 
different types of firms); Irwin A. Kishner, Market Trends, Legal 
Developments, and Their Effect on M&A Documentation, in MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS LAW 2013: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATEGIES FOR THE 
UPCOMING YEAR  5, 5 (2013) (discussing the outsized influence that Delaware 
courts have because of the large number of M&A suits litigated in Delaware). 
 174. See generally Anderson & Manns, supra note 15 (discussing 
idiosyncratic drafting in the M&A context). 
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reveal more about the shortcomings of M&A lawyers and their 
failures to economize on legal drafting than about the value of 
Delaware law.   
The textual focus of our study means we cannot discount 
this possibility completely as we cannot directly observe the 
drafting process and what factors shape lawyers’ 
decision-making in drafting. But given the sophistication of 
M&A lawyers at elite firms and the concentration of the M&A 
legal market, it seems very unlikely that lawyers are ignorant 
of the significance of legal defaults or ignore them amidst the 
drafting process.175 To the extent that drafting pathologies exist, 
it is unclear why they would be more or less likely to arise in 
Delaware versus non-Delaware deals. But what is clear is that 
Delaware M&A agreements were at least as long and generally 
longer than agreements from other states even when we 
accounted for a spectrum of control variables including the deal 
structure, the quality of law firms, deal complexity, and the size 
of the transaction.176 While it is possible that Delaware 
statutory and judicial defaults may have significant advantages 
over the defaults of other jurisdictions, lawyers’ failure to place 
greater reliance on Delaware law in legal drafting (compared to 
other jurisdictions) suggest that they perceive that there is no 
advantage to relying on Delaware defaults.177 
Our analysis of the content of the agreements further shows 
only superficial differences between agreements relying on 
Delaware law and courts compared to those relying on other 
states’ law and courts.178 In fact, the most predictive variable for 
the final product of the agreement’s text is the precedent 
agreement from which counsel copied the original draft.179 This 
 
 175. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 53, at 816–18 (suggesting that 
lawyers are highly aware of the front- and back-end costs of contract drafting). 
 176. See supra Part V. 
 177. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 53, at 818 (implying that lawyers will 
increasingly rely on defaults if those defaults are advantageous); see also supra 
Part V (using data to illustrate the relative length of M&A agreements relying 
on Delaware defaults and the defaults of other jurisdictions). 
 178. See supra Table 9 (listing superficial language to remove from the 
Random Forest predication). 
 179. See supra Table 5 (examining choice of law, forum, and incorporation 
after controlling for precedent length).   
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fact reinforces the potential interpretation that reliance on 
statutory and judicial defaults does not play as significant a 
factor in legal drafting as incomplete contract theory 
suggests.180 The strong influence of the precedent document 
does reveal, however, the importance of the choice of the 
precedent on the form and content of the final document. This 
path-dependent process of textual evolution in turn informs 
questions about why contracts are incomplete based on lawyers’ 
drafting practices.181 This finding may call for a reassessment of 
how broadly to construe the implications of incomplete contract 
theory, and at minimum underscores the need for greater 
empirical research to examine the potential and limits of this 
law and economics paradigm and contractual drafting. 
An important caveat in analyzing these interpretations of 
the data is the need to address the possibility that agreements 
governed by Delaware law are longer because the transactions 
involved are more complex.182 It is possible that transactions 
selecting Delaware law disproportionately involve novel legal 
issues or other forms of complexity, or simply employ counsel 
more inclined to create prolix agreements.183 In that case, the 
word savings attributable to Delaware law might be reduced or 
even negated by these selection effects. Although we have 
attempted to control for the complexity of the transactions, it is 
possible our controls failed to control completely for deal 
complexity. At the same time, that possibility is significantly 
reduced by several factors discussed in our responses to 
potential objections in Part VI.B.2. 
The centerpiece for our analysis is the construction of 
models of the lengths of agreements that have the agreements’ 
 
 180. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 53, at 818 (suggesting that in 
anticipation of litigation, statutory and judicial defaults play an important 
role). 
 181. See Robert Anderson IV, Path Dependence, Information, and 
Contracting in Business Law and Economics, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 553, 558–62 
(theorizing why the use of precedent documents leads to contract 
incompleteness). 
 182. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 183. See Kishner, supra note 173, at 8 (discussing Delaware’s influence on 
M&A transactions). 
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length in words serve as the dependent variable.184 We 
conducted regression analysis of the two key independent 
variables (choice of law and the choice of forum for Delaware 
versus non-Delaware) separately, as well as their connection to 
the target’s state of incorporation.185 We included a broad set of 
control variables including cash-only mergers (to control for the 
greater length of cash-only mergers), a date variable (to control 
for the increase in length over time), logged-enterprise value (to 
account for the potential impact of transaction size on deal 
length), and controls for major deal elements (to control for 
complexities that could potentially affect deal length).186 We 
also included dummy variables to analyze “special” industries 
in the data set (banking firms and REITs) as well as to account 
for whether the buyer’s and seller’s counsel were “Top 20” firms 
to account for any potential impact of elite firms on legal 
drafting.187 
This set of control variables is not comprehensive, as we 
could expand on these models to account for a broader range of 
deal dimensions that could affect the length of agreements as 
we refine our analysis.188 That is an objection that can be made 
for virtually all regression analysis studies as there are always 
more control variables that could be considered.189 But the 
control variables we use do offer statistically significant 
evidence that the choice of Delaware law is correlated with 
longer agreements, even when we account for the structure of 
the deal, the date of the deal, and the size of the industry.190 Our 
finding that the choice of Delaware law is associated with at 
least one thousand more words than agreements that opt for the 
law of other states suggests that lawyers may place no more 
confidence in Delaware defaults than those of other jurisdictions 
 
 184. See supra Part V.A. (detailing the analytical methods used to gather 
data). 
 185. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 186. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 187. See supra notes 124–127 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra Part V.A. 
 189. See MONTGOMERY, ET. AL, supra note 119, at 15–16 (discussing 
residuals and their impact on linear regression model adequacy).  
 190. See supra Table 3 (incorporating control variables for deal structure, 
complexity, and industry size). 
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and therefore invest at least as much time and energy (and 
generally more) in drafting terms for Delaware deals than their 
non-Delaware counterpart agreements.191 
Our modeling of the agreement length by choice of forum 
(without other Delaware controls) produced similar results to 
the choice of Delaware law analysis, which we would expect 
because the choice of forum and choice of law are correlated.192 
However, in models controlling for Delaware governing law, the 
Delaware choice of forum results were not statistically 
significant.193 While all acquisition agreements in the data set 
selected Delaware or another state to serve as the governing law 
for the agreement, not every agreement chose an exclusive 
forum for the resolution of disputes. This fact may lead to 
selection bias in the results for Delaware choice of forum, which 
is consistent with the effect for choice of forum disappearing 
(and indeed reversing) as deal complexity variables are 
controlled.194 But the larger story is that Delaware choice of law 
and choice of forum are generally correlated, and in the deals in 
which they go together they are associated with significantly 
longer agreements than in non-Delaware choice of law and 
choice of forum agreements.195 This fact suggests that lawyers 
do not perceive any less of a need to invest time and energy in 
drafting Delaware deals than they do in drafting other deals, 
and in fact generally invest far more effort in drafting Delaware 
deals. 
Our finding in Table 3 that companies incorporated in 
Delaware who opt for Delaware choice of law are associated with 
shorter agreements than for non-Delaware companies who opt 
for Delaware choice of law does suggest a potential caveat and 
a future research direction for our results. This finding suggests 
that some of the additional length may be attributable to 
counsel for non-Delaware incorporated companies having to 
tailor agreements to fit non-Delaware corporations into the 
ambit of Delaware law. However, in an unreported regression 
 
 191. See supra Part V.A. 
 192. See supra Part IV.A. 
 193. See supra Table 3. 
 194. See supra Table 3. 
 195. See supra Table 4. 
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we analyzed only Delaware-incorporated companies opting for 
Delaware choice of law or Delaware choice of forum, and we still 
found that there is a positive (although not statistically 
significant) increase in length for Delaware agreements 
compared to agreements in which companies opt for 
non-Delaware choice of law or forum. This finding suggests that 
M&A lawyers may not be merely conforming agreements to fit 
governing Delaware law, but instead may actually be drafting 
more detailed agreements whose terms are opting out of 
Delaware defaults. 
It is possible that the length of agreements does not 
completely capture the extent to which jurisdictional differences 
drive agreement drafting. For this reason we applied a Random 
Forest classifier approach to the data.196 The Random Forest 
approach was able to predict agreements that opted for 
Delaware choice of law and non-Delaware choice of law.197 But 
the distinctions the approach identified were largely superficial 
terms related to the nomenclature of Delaware compared to 
other jurisdictions.198 This point may help to explain the one 
notable exception that runs counter to our finding of Delaware 
agreements being systematically longer: why non-Delaware 
incorporated companies who opted for Delaware choice of law in 
M&A agreements had marginally longer agreements than their 
Delaware incorporated counterparts who also opted for 
Delaware choice of law.199 There may simply be a certain level 
of “Delaware overhead” verbiage necessary to translate between 
jurisdictions. But this analysis did not identify differences in 
substantive terms that would allow us to say with greater 
certainty that the difference in length of agreements that opt for 
Delaware choice of law or Delaware forum are longer because 
parties are contracting out of Delaware defaults in favor of more 
precise, substantive provisions.200 The Random Forest analysis 
therefore lends support to the idea that Delaware agreements 
are not drafted materially differently from non-Delaware 
 
 196. See supra Part V.B. 
 197. See supra Table 7. 
 198. See supra Table 8. 
 199. See supra Table 3. 
 200. See supra Table 10. 
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agreements in their substantive content, a fact which 
underscores the apparent absence of an advantage to relying on 
Delaware law. 
One limitation of the paper is that we cannot conclusively 
point towards an explanation for what is shaping lawyers’ 
decisions throughout the contractual drafting process. That, in 
part, reflects the limitation of engaging in reverse engineering 
analysis based on observing the merger agreement outcomes. 
We are neither using survey data to observe what lawyers think 
they are doing when drafting the agreements, nor do we have 
access to the detailed drafts that could showcase the give and 
take of the negotiation and drafting process because of the limits 
of public company disclosures (and the reluctance of law firms 
to share work product from the various stages of the drafting 
process with researchers).  
But one plausible interpretation of the results in this paper 
is that regardless of the perception lawyers have of what they 
are doing in legal drafting, the strong pull of the precedent 
document’s text dominates the deal-by-deal judgment about 
client needs.201 The results in Table 5 show that the strongest 
predictor of the number of words in a document is the number 
of words in its precedent document, a fact that shows a 
tremendous path-dependency in transactional drafting. We 
have extensively documented the persistence of vestigial terms 
and left-over verbiage from precedent agreements in previous 
work.202 Our results therefore might stand for another 
proposition, which is that the legal work product that 
transactional lawyers create may be excessively influenced by 
the happenstance of which precedent agreement was chosen as 
the foundation for the drafting process or how the draft evolved, 
rather than the needs of the specific transaction or the defaults 
of the underlying choice of law or forum. Either way, our 
findings suggest that no Delaware advantage in legal drafting 
 
 201. See Anderson & Manns, supra note 16, at 57 (theorizing that 
substantive similarities in distinct merger agreements reveal inefficiencies in 
the drafting process). 
 202. See generally id. (using computer textual analysis to identify 
precedent documents in the merger agreement context); Anderson & Manns, 
supra note 15 (examining the effect of inefficient drafting on boilerplate 
language in merger agreements). 
  
1262 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1197 (2020) 
 
exists for M&A agreements based on Delaware choice of law or 
forum. Instead, we found the opposite to be true empirically as 
Delaware M&A agreements were generally longer than 
agreements whose defaults rest on statutory and judicial 
defaults from non-Delaware jurisdictions. 
B. Objections 
The key finding from our analysis is that reliance on 
Delaware law does not lead to parties economizing on deal 
terms, contrary to the prediction we would derive from the 
standard law and economic analysis of contracting.203 In fact, in 
most of the models, Delaware agreements were longer in a 
statistically significant way.204 This type of “equivalence” 
finding is subject to a number of common objections, so we 
address them at some length in this section. Although some of 
these objections have merit, deeper analysis of the data refutes 
each of them. 
1. The “Equivalence” Objection 
First, some might argue that because the Delaware 
variables were not significant in some of the models, the 
analysis fails to show that Delaware law does not allow drafters 
to economize on contractual terms.205 There are two responses 
to this objection. First, in all models where Delaware choice of 
law was analyzed separately from the highly correlated 
variables on forum choice and state of incorporation, the 
coefficient was positive and significant.206 Thus, for those 
models we can reject the null hypothesis that Delaware choice 
of law has no effect on agreement length in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis that it is associated with increased 
agreement length. 
Second, even if one focuses on the models in which there is 
equivalence between Delaware and non-Delaware agreements, 
the model still tells us quite a bit about the effect of Delaware 
 
 203. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra Part V. 
 205. See supra Part V.A. 
 206. See supra notes 134–136 and accompanying text. 
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law. In fact, the contrary argument is based on a common 
misunderstanding of hypothesis testing. It is true that in those 
models we cannot reject the hypothesis that Delaware has any 
effect on lowering the word count, but we can reject the 
hypothesis that Delaware has any substantial effect beyond a 
certain size on agreement length with 95 percent confidence.207 
Even in the most unfavorable model for the “no effect” 
hypothesis (Model 2 of Table 4), the confidence interval for “All 
Delaware” deals’ effect on word count is -428.4 to 883.6. Thus, 
we can reject the hypothesis that reliance on Delaware law can 
substitute for more than 428.4 words, which is a quite narrow 
margin in an agreement averaging over 36,000 words.208 Even 
in the least favorable model the confidence intervals are quite 
compressed which suggests that Delaware law has no impact on 
legal drafting or is still correlated with a longer length compared 
to agreements grounded in other jurisdictions.209 
2. The “Confounding Variables” Objection 
The second objection centers on the concern that our results 
may be influenced by confounding variables.210 It is possible 
that transactions choosing Delaware law may tend to have 
higher complexity than transactions grounded in other states’ 
laws, and that our independent variables do not adequately 
control for that extra complexity. If that premise is true, we may 
have incompletely controlled for transaction complexity. It is 
possible that the increased complexity of Delaware transactions 
is offsetting the savings in word count allowed by reliance on 
Delaware statutory and judicial defaults. 
 
 207. See supra Part V.A. 
 208. See supra Table 4.   
 209. See, e.g., William C. Blackwelder, Proving the Null Result in Clinical 
Trials, 3 CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIALS 345, 348–50 (1982) (discussing the 
significance of null results in bioequivalence testing). Although this type of 
analysis is less common in the social sciences “p-value” world, such analyses 
are quite common in the scientific literature called “equivalence testing.” Id. 
This approach is especially common in medical research in bioequivalence 
testing, in which null results with narrow confidence intervals are used to 
establish the equivalence of two pharmaceutical preparations. Id. 
 210. See MONTGOMERY, ET AL., supra note 119, at 15–17. 
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There are several strong counterarguments to this claim. 
First, the fact that choice of forum loses significance as control 
variables are added in Table 3 (and indeed switches sign), while 
the same does not happen for choice of law is strong support that 
the choice of law coefficient does not result from confounding 
(although the choice of forum may). Also, the fact that the “Top 
20” variable for the law firms involved is small in magnitude 
and not significant is telling.211 The “Top 20” law firms are 
overwhelmingly used in more complex transactions, and yet 
they do not predict greater agreement length when the control 
variables are used.212 Indeed, merely removing the logged 
transaction value and the “Delaware law” variables from the 
controls made both the “Top 20” seller firm and the “Top 20” 
buyer firm statistically significant predictors of longer 
agreements.213 These relationships were reversed by the 
inclusion of control variables, suggesting we have successfully 
controlled for the role of “deal complexity” in the process.214 
Finally, the control for precedent length should incorporate any 
deal complexity concerns, as the precedent is, at least in theory, 
chosen for its similarity to the deal at hand (including most 
complexities).215 
Indeed, it is possible that confounding variables work the 
other way. There are some controls we used that have the 
potential to artificially reduce the effect of the choice of 
Delaware law or forum on increasing the length of agreements. 
In particular, the most common category of non-Delaware 
companies are banks and bank holding companies.216 Banking 
companies have lower rates of Delaware incorporation than do 
other companies (due to regulatory reasons since state banks 
are incorporated in the state that they operate and are regulated 
 
 211. See supra Table 3. 
 212. See supra Table 3. 
 213. See supra Table 3. 
 214. See supra Table 3. 
 215. See supra Table 5 (controlling for length of precedent document). 
 216. See FED. RES., INSURED U.S.-CHARTERED COMMERCIAL BANKS THAT 
HAVE CONSOLIDATED ASSETS OF $300 OR MORE (2020), https://perma.cc/5NSQ-
U7KW (PDF) (demonstrating through bank location data the small number of 
banks incorporated in Delaware). 
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in).217 However, they also have shorter agreements because of 
drafting practices peculiar to the industry and their reliance on 
stringent regulatory frameworks that are difficult to contract 
around.218 Thus, it is possible that our controls actually suggest 
even stronger evidence that either reliance on Delaware does 
not enable lawyers to reduce contract detail and length or that 
lawyers are not recognizing and taking advantage of the 
potential value of these statutory and judicial defaults when 
engaged in legal drafting. Either of these potential conclusions 
underscore the need for greater scrutiny in future research of 
both the ostensible value-added of Delaware law and the 
potential pathologies taking place in the legal drafting process. 
 
3. The “All the Important Terms Are Included in Every Deal” 
Objection 
A third objection one might make is that the cost of 
including additional terms is relatively small compared to the 
magnitude of M&A deals, which therefore makes it easier for 
lawyers to justify including all the important terms in every 
deal. In other words, whether the governing law has desirable 
default rules or not, parties include all the important terms in 
every deal, simply duplicating the desirable default rules in 
some transactions and overriding undesirable default rules in 
other transactions. Thus, the fact that we find that parties do 
not economize on terms in deals based on Delaware choice of law 
and forum may potentially not say as much about the 
significance of Delaware’s statutory and judicial defaults as 
about inefficiencies in the drafting process.219 
This objection has three significant problems. First, the cost 
of additional drafting effort is not solely the cost of additional 
 
 217. See Nicholas Economides et al., The Political Economy of Branching 
Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition 
Among Small and Large Banks, 39 J.L. & ECON. 667, 668–69 (1996) (noting 
that banking regulations place geographical limits on bank branching). 
 218. See id. (discussing how commercial banks are subject to a high degree 
of regulation in “virtually all countries”). 
 219. See Anderson & Manns, supra note 16, at 64–65 (discussing the use 
of precedent documents in transaction drafting). 
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attorney time, which may well be low compared to the 
magnitude of the transaction.220 The larger cost is the delay in 
the drafting process of including additional terms, which grows 
with the magnitude of the transaction. Spelling out additional 
terms is costly even if the actual cost of lawyers’ time is low in 
an individual deal because of the time-compressed nature of the 
merger agreement drafting process.221 
The second problem is that if all the important terms are 
included in every deal (because of the insignificance of costs 
relative to the magnitude of the deal), why does the length of 
the agreement vary strongly with the value of the consideration 
being paid? In the full model of Table 3 the coefficient on the log 
of deal size is 967.222 This implies, for example, that a $20 billion 
acquisition will have 5,123 additional words compared to a $100 
million acquisition.223 Considering that the average number of 
words of the agreements in the database is about 36,309, that is 
approximately 14 percent more words based on transaction size. 
The relationship of transaction size to word count suggests that 
cost is constraining the expression of at least some of the 
important terms in smaller transactions. Therefore, at 
minimum we would expect to see that lawyers in smaller 
transactions would be seeking to economize on drafting and 
leveraging the value of statutory and judicial defaults (to the 
extent to which the defaults truly add value and lawyers are 
able and willing to recognize this value). 
Third, important sections of merger agreements do contain 
what is likely suboptimal detail, and this produces a significant 
(and increasing) number of litigated cases (as well as untold 
interpretive disputes that are settled privately).224 This fact 
 
 220. See id. at 90 (“[E]ven though the costs of M&A lawyers appear high, 
legal bills still constitute only a small fraction of the cost of M&A 
transactions.”). 
 221. See Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in “Legalese,” 77 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 63 (2001) (explaining the motivation to use precedent 
documents). 
 222. See supra Part V. 
 223. This is calculated by 967*log(10,000,000,000)-967*log(100,000,000). 
 224. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, 
Explaining the Increase in M&A Litigation, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 559–60 (2015) 
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suggests that parties are, in fact, constrained by costs in spelling 
out the optimal resolution of all contingencies in the agreement 
because of the potential to avoid litigation and the resulting 
uncertainties. 
VII. Conclusion 
We have shown that M&A agreements that opt for 
Delaware choice of law or forum are no shorter than agreements 
based on other jurisdictions’ choice of law or forum even when 
we control for a spectrum of variables, such as the deal 
structure, time, size of the transaction, and major deal 
elements. Delaware-governed agreements generally appear to 
be longer in statistically significant ways, even with other 
factors fully controlled. These findings support the hypothesis 
that corporate lawyers do not rely on the perceived superiority 
of Delaware law and courts, at least in terms of how they design 
contracts.225 Lawyers may simply give lip service to the 
reputation of Delaware law and its judiciary, but when drafting 
M&A agreements pay no more attention (and possibly less) to 
the statutory and judicial defaults than they would to the 
defaults of any other jurisdiction. This conclusion shows that 
Delaware statutory and judicial defaults do not appear to 
matter in a context where the Delaware difference in business 
law and adjudication should be clear. Ultimately, this finding 
calls into question the durability of Delaware’s outsized 
reputation in corporate law. Lawyers’ practices in drafting 
speak to the degree of their confidence in Delaware and the need 
for Delaware’s legislature and judiciary to enhance the 
comprehensiveness and precision of Delaware corporate law 
defaults.   
 
 
(discussing the increase in number and scale of M&A litigation involving 
public company mergers, noting that by 2015 over 97.5 percent of public 
company mergers involving deals over $100 million faced litigation).   
 225. See, e.g., Carney, Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 17, at 134–42 
(pointing to survey data to argue that lawyers’ confidence in and reliance on 
Delaware corporate law is based both on Delaware’s reputation and lawyers’ 
ignorance of the alternative corporate law frameworks offered by other states). 
